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Abstract 
In the background of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, this study proposes a CGE 
assessment of multilateral liberalisation of market access for non-agricultural products. The 
scenarios considered include the so-called ‘Girard proposal’ (with alternative choices for the 
coefficient involved), the removal of tariff peaks and complete liberalisation. This study is the 
first to take into account the difference between bound and applied tariffs, while considering all 
the enforced preferential trade arrangements and computing tariff cuts at the detailed product 
level (HS-6 classification). Although the liberalisation of market access for non-agricultural 
products is found to be welfare-enhancing at the world level, cross-country distributive effects 
prove significant. A soft liberalisation would not significantly reduce applied duties in 
developing countries, owing to their considerable binding overhang. By contrast, a deep 
liberalisation would entail fierce price competition among those developing countries that are 
largely specialised in similar sectors and in the same product quality range.   
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Summary 
his work aims at studying the underlying stakes of the ambitious Doha Ministerial 
Declaration agenda for the liberalisation of market access for non-agricultural products, 
with special emphasis on developing countries. The latter are either reluctant to liberalise 
access to their own markets for non-agricultural products, or condition any progress in this area 
on improved access to developed countries’ markets for agricultural products. Do these 
positions really reflect mixed gains for developing countries as a result of liberalisation in this 
area, and if so, for what reasons and according to what pattern? These are the main questions 
addressed in this study. 
In the negotiations on market access for non-agricultural products, the design of the tariff-
cutting formula that will be applied is a key issue. In this respect, the basis for future 
negotiations remains the Draft Elements of Modalities put forward in 2003 by Ambassador 
Dominique Girard, which was revised the same year. Yet properly assessing the impact of such 
a tariff-cutting formula requires working with tariffs computed at a detailed level as well as the 
cuts in bound duties, while evaluating how these factors influence trade flows using preferential 
applied tariffs.  
Several recent studies have dealt with the impact of liberalising market access for non-
agricultural products in the Doha Round. They show that market access is still ‘unfinished 
business’, since applied protection remains substantial in many countries (especially developing 
ones). In addition, the scope of binding is far from complete in most developing countries and 
the binding overhang – i.e. the gap between bound and applied most-favoured nation (MFN) 
duties – is large in many cases, and again is particularly in developing countries.  
Assessments of the impact of liberalisation are generally carried out using CGE models. Among 
recent noteworthy improvements in this type of analysis, pre-experiment simulations, the 
measurement of the extent of the binding overhang, a careful record of preferential trade 
agreements and a comparison of scenarios designed at the detailed level of the products have 
been separately proposed in the literature.  
Against this background, our work brings several original contributions, the most important one 
being the initiative to combine all the previous improvements for the first time. The scenarios 
considered include the so-called ‘Girard proposal’ (with alternative choices for the coefficient 
involved), the removal of tariff peaks and complete liberalisation, with all tariff cuts being 
computed at the detailed product level (HS-6 classification). All preferential agreements 
enforced in 2001 are accounted for. Incidentally, we also take into account commitments that 
were made in 2001 but not yet implemented, and those made by countries that have recently 
acceded to the WTO. A pre-experiment simulation is carried out, in which all these 
commitments are assumed to have been implemented.  
These particular characteristics of our study are likely to profoundly influence the assessment as 
compared with the simplifying assumptions used so far in the literature, since cutting bound 
tariffs leaves applied duties unchanged in many cases, especially when the gap between the 
initial bound and applied duties is significantly greater than the applied duty. Further, 
integrating preferences allows us to tackle the so-called ‘preference erosion’ issue. Finally yet 
importantly, computing tariff cuts at the most detailed level enables us to track the true impact 
of the liberalisation formulas. 
We consider the following scenarios (which are only applied to non-agricultural products, 
according to the WTO definition): a) peaks elimination (ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariffs 
above 15% replaced by a 15% AVE tariff); b) complete liberalisation (tariffs completely 
removed for all non-agricultural products); c) Girard 0.65 (Girard’s proposal, using coefficient 
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B = 0.65); d) Girard 1 (Girard’s proposal, using coefficient B = 1); e) Girard 2 (using coefficient 
B = 2); f) Girard 1+ the special and differential treatment (SDT) (developing countries that have 
consolidated at least 35% of their tariff lines use the coefficient B = 2 instead of unity); and g) 
Girard 1 on the applied tariff (applied rather than bound tariffs are cut according to the formula 
of scenario d). We assume in each scenario that least developed countries (LDCs) and those 
countries whose binding coverage on non-agricultural tariff lines is less than 35% should not be 
required to liberalise their market access. 
Applying the Girard formula with coefficient B set to unity has a widespread impact on 
protection. In developed countries, the average protection for industrial products is 
approximately halved, with a stronger cut in textiles/clothing, for which the harmonising effect 
is significant. The decline in average tariff duties is weaker in relative terms in developing 
countries, but is stronger in absolute terms. This tariff-cutting formula also entails a strong 
harmonising effect across developing countries (especially in the textiles/clothing sector) except 
in India and the Maghreb region. The other scenarios produce results in line with their design, 
provided that the impact of the tariff-cutting formula on applied protection is strongly related to 
the extent of the initial binding overhang. This creates a significant difference as far as 
developed countries are concerned, except for Korea. By contrast, for developing countries 
direct cuts in applied duties deliver far greater liberalisation, thus showing that the rather large 
initial binding overhang significantly dampens the impact of the tariff-cutting formula. 
We introduce this tariff data in a static version of the MIRAGE model. The measurement of 
border protection and the computation of actual liberalisation resulting from tariff-cutting 
formulas used in this study bring substantial improvements in comparison with previous work. 
Our simulations are based on a measurement of ad valorem equivalent protection at the six-digit 
level of the harmonised system for 163 countries and 208 partners in 2001, taking into account 
all the enforced preferential agreements (reciprocal as well as non-reciprocal). 
The pre-experiment simulation includes the EU enlargement in 2004, the dismantling of the 
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), the entry of newly acceded members to the WTO (including 
China) and the full application of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The 
equilibrium of the world economy obtained as a result of this pre-experiment simulation is used 
as the baseline for subsequent simulations. In order to keep the model tractable we limit our 
analysis to 20 sectors, with a focus on non-agricultural goods and 22 regions. 
One of the key results of this exercise concerns prices: multilateral liberalisation is generally 
expected to increase import prices, at least for those products experiencing the greatest 
liberalisation, since lowered trade barriers increase the world demand for imports. Here this is 
not the case, however, as a result of applying the Girard formula with coefficient B = 1. The 
extent of the international division of labour in place in most industrial sectors helps to explain 
this finding. Imported intermediate inputs account for a substantial share of the total cost for 
many products. For most producers, lowered tariff duties thus mean cheaper intermediate inputs 
and hence lower production costs. These price changes lead to a slight improvement in the terms 
of trade for industrialised countries – benefiting in particular Asian developed countries – 
despite a slight deterioration in North America. By contrast, the developing countries experience 
a general if limited deterioration in terms of trade, with the sole exceptions of China and Russia. 
As a result of their high initial levels of protection, India and the Maghreb experience the 
greatest deterioration. 
A second mechanism must be stressed. Given the trade-balance constraint, changes in industrial 
imports and exports are closely linked and thus industrial trade increases strongly in those 
countries where initial protection is high, such as India, the Maghreb and those in the South 
African Customs Union (SACU). It also increases significantly in countries that have a strong 
competitive position in industrial products when taken as a whole, particularly in China, Japan INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | iii 
 
and Korea. The regions of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia, which mostly envelop 
countries that are exempted from any requirements, do not experience any significant increases 
in industrial imports. But nor do they benefit from any increase in industrial exports owing to 
eroded preferences. 
As measured through equivalent variation, worldwide income gains appear to be very limited 
(+0.04%). Among developed countries, Asian countries are the main gainers, which is 
unsurprising given their strong competitive positions in the world trade of industrial products. 
Among developing countries, the outcome shows a heightened contrast. The Maghreb countries 
enjoy a strong income gain (almost +2%), while Russia, SACU, the Tigers and Turkey record 
slight gains. Meanwhile, all the other developing countries suffer an income loss as a result of 
this liberalisation, in most cases due to deterioration in their terms of trade. Although these 
losses are of a low order of magnitude, this result is quite striking, particularly in contrast with 
the results observed for developed countries. 
The comparison of scenarios a) to e) reveals the more uneven impact resulting from more 
ambitious liberalisation scenarios. India is a good illustration of this: the welfare loss is –0.15% 
in our main scenario. It doubles when we use a parameter of 0.65 instead of unity in the Girard 
formula. It is even four times as large with complete liberalisation, whereas the welfare loss 
becomes negligible with a coefficient of 2 in the Girard formula. Finally, it is noteworthy that 
although almost all of the SSA countries are exempt from any liberalisation commitment, they 
are adversely affected in welfare terms in all the scenarios, with the exception of the elimination 
of tariff peaks. This loss, while of limited amount, is the result of preference erosion and of the 
relative price decline of their main export products. 
It is worth stressing that this exercise does not aim at giving an evaluation of the gains to be 
expected from the Doha Round. Other items on the agenda, such as trade facilitation or services, 
are not included here (as their modelling is generally ad hoc and based on loose data, we chose 
to leave them aside in this study). More importantly, our central set of simulations does not 
capture the gains associated with increased market access, domestic support or export subsidies 
in agriculture. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis carried out validates the assumption that 
non-agricultural market access can be studied independently from agricultural liberalisation 
without significant bias.  
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1. Introduction 
The failure to reach an agreement in the Doha Round of trade negotiations in Cancún blatantly 
highlighted how difficult it is to strike a deal on around 20 issues among nearly 150 different 
countries. Negotiation requires compromise, and success mainly depends on finding the 
solutions to a handful of sensitive issues and reaching a balance between the offensive and 
defensive interests of most countries. Market access for non-agricultural products is certainly 
among these important items. The Doha Ministerial Declaration states that negotiations should 
seek “by modalities to be agreed, to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation”. The Declaration also 
emphasises the need to “take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and 
least-developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction 
commitments”.  
The agenda for liberalising market access for non-agricultural products is ambitious. This study 
aims at identifying the underlying opportunities and challenges, with a special emphasis on 
developing countries. Many developing countries are reluctant to liberalise access to their own 
markets for non-agricultural products, and others condition any progress in this area on 
improved access to developed countries’ markets for agricultural products. Do these positions 
really reflect mixed gains for developing countries as a result of non-agricultural liberalisation, 
and if so, what are the channels through which these effects arise? These are the main questions 
addressed in this study.
1 
Since the Doha Ministerial Conference, negotiations on non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA) have given rise to a number of proposals. To date, the basis for future negotiations is 
the Geneva Framework Agreement of 2 August 2004 (WTO, 2004) – the so-called ‘July 
package’. This text is important by virtue of its mere existence, since it sets the stage for future 
negotiations. It also takes stock of the agreements reached on important issues, such as the 
objective of binding all tariffs and of applying a non-linear tariff-cutting formula (except for 
countries with low initial binding coverage), the principle of less than full reciprocity (as 
discussed in the Doha Declaration) and the principle of exempting least developed countries 
(LDCs) from any liberalisation commitment.
2 Still, this Framework Agreement does not address 
the key issue: the tariff-cutting formula to be applied. In this respect, as emphasised in the 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions by participants of the 2005 GTAP 
conference, along with those from Paul Baker. 
2 The only contribution expected from LDCs is to “substantially increase their level of binding 
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Agreement itself,
3 the basis for future negotiations remains the Draft Elements of Modalities put 
forward in May 2003 by Ambassador Dominique Girard, the then Chairman of the WTO’s 
Negotiating Group on NAMA, revised in August 2003 (WTO, 2003; hereafter the revised 
version is referred to as the ‘Girard proposal’).  
Assessing the impact of this type of tariff-cutting formula raises various issues. First, as stated 
in the Framework Agreement, it should be “a non-linear formula applied on a line-by-line basis” 
(WTO, 2004, p. B-1). In order to account for the corresponding harmonising effect on tariffs, 
tariff cuts must be computed at the detailed level. Second, such a formula is to be applied to ad 
valorem duties or the ad valorem equivalent (AVEs) of specific duties.
4 These AVEs must 
therefore be appropriately calculated. Third, the tariff cuts proposed concern bound duties. 
Evaluating how these cuts influence trade flows requires knowledge of how they are reflected in 
applied tariffs.  
Several recent studies have dealt with the impact of liberalising NAMA. Bacchetta & Bora 
(2001 and 2003) paint a detailed picture of protection in industrial products, both in terms of 
bound and applied most-favoured nation (MFN) protection. They show that market access is 
still an “unfinished business” (in the words of WTO, 2001), since applied protection is still 
substantial in many countries (most of all in developing countries). In addition, the scope of 
binding is far from complete in most developing countries, and the binding overhang – i.e. the 
gap between the bound and applied MFN duties – is large in many cases, especially in 
developing countries.  
Assessments of the impact of liberalisation are generally carried out using CGE models (see e.g. 
Francois & Martin, 2003; World Bank, 2003), although partial equilibrium models are also used 
in some instances (see e.g. Hoekman et al., 2002a). Among recent noteworthy improvements, 
Francois & Martin (2003) introduced a refined policy scenario, taking into account a pre-
experiment simulation. Building on the work of Walkenhorst & Dihel (2002) aiming at 
characterising the extent of the binding overhang, Lippoldt & Kowalski (2003) account for the 
way in which proposed tariff cuts would be reflected in applied tariffs. Yet the binding overhang 
(the gap between the bound and applied duties) is only computed and accounted for at the 
GTAP sector level,
5 i.e. at a highly aggregated sector level. Laird et al. (2003) compare six 
important, recent proposals, among which is the Girard proposal. They are the first to compute 
the corresponding tariff cuts at the detailed level (HS-6), but this is done basically on MFN 
tariffs. Neither preferential trade agreements nor the binding overhang are taken into account.  
Our work builds on this literature and brings several original contributions. The CGE model 
used, nicknamed ‘MIRAGE’,
6 includes imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale and 
horizontal product differentiation. This model is comparable to those used for instance by 
Francois et al. (1995), Harrison et al. (1997) and Francois & Martin (2004). One distinctive 
feature, however, is the ability to account for quality differences among products exported by 
developed and developing countries. This vertical differentiation, now well documented by 
empirical studies (see e.g. Fontagné et al., 1998; Schott, 2004), can significantly influence the 
 
                                                 
3 Annex B of the Framework Agreement “confirm[s] [member countries’] intention to use [the Chair’s 
Draft Elements of Modalities] as a reference for the future work of the Negotiating Group” (WTO, 2004, 
p. B-1).  
4 The American proposal is an exception to this, which aims at directly reducing specific tariffs. 
5 We refer here to the sector classification of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, version 
6.  
6 MIRAGE stands for modelling international relationships in applied general equilibrium. INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 3 
 
nature of the consequences induced by a given liberalisation scenario. With the exception of 
protection data, the model is calibrated using the GTAP 6.03 database, the base year of which is 
2001 (see Dimaranan & McDougall, 2005).  
The main contribution of this work lies in the measurement of border protection and in the 
computation of actual liberalisation resulting from a tariff-cutting formula. Bound and applied 
duties (whether ad valorem, specific, mixed or compound) are consistently and accurately 
measured at the HS-6 product level (the most disaggregated level for which harmonised 
information exists). All preferential agreements enforced in 2001 are accounted for. 
Incidentally, we also take into account commitments that were not yet implemented in 2001, as 
well as those made by recently acceded countries. A pre-experiment simulation is carried out, in 
which all of these commitments are assumed to have been implemented.  
Thus, for the first time ever in the domain of multilateral liberalisation of non-agricultural 
market access, we are able to simultaneously account for trade preferences, the binding 
overhang and the non-linearity of the formula. This is likely to profoundly influence the 
assessment, as compared with the simplifying assumptions used so far in the literature. WTO 
agreements have tended to cut bound tariffs, which leaves applied duties unchanged in many 
cases, particularly when the gap between initial bound and applied duties is significantly large. 
Francois & Martin (2004) rightly emphasised that lowering bound tariffs entails a gain in itself, 
given the stochastic nature of tariffs, and this should be kept in mind while interpreting our 
results. In determining a set-up such as the one considered here, however, only applied tariffs 
actually matter. 
Given the background described above, it is natural to use the Girard proposal as the basis for 
assessing the impact of NAMA liberalisation in the Doha Round. This proposal builds upon the 
so-called ‘Swiss Formula’, which was initially proposed during the Tokyo Round and allows for 
harmonised, non-linear tariff cuts. Nevertheless (and possibly inspired by the Chinese proposal), 
Girard’s proposal introduces new flexibility, by making the formula’s coefficient of reduction 
depend on the initial average tariff of each country.  
It is finally worth stressing that this exercise does not aim at giving an evaluation of the gains to 
be expected from the Doha Round. Other items on its agenda – such as the (remaining) 
Singapore issues – are not included here; however, the modelling of these items is generally ad 
hoc.
7 More importantly, our central set of simulations do not capture the gains associated with 
increased market access, domestic support or export subsidies in agriculture (see e.g. FAPRI, 
2002; Francois et al., 2003; Bouët et al., 2005; Hoekman et al., 2002b). In the same way, gains 
from the liberalisation of services should be added – yet in this area we are collectively missing 
reliable data. We believe that non-agricultural market access deserves a specific analysis, which 
is why it is treated separately. This approach of course raises the question of the degree to which 
the topics can be separated, not only in terms of negotiation (by definition, topics are tied by the 
single undertaking principle), but also in terms of analysis: Does combining the effects found 
separately for different topics provide a satisfactory proxy of the global impact? Or, equally, 
does the impact of liberalisation in one field strongly depend on the outcome in other fields? In 
order to test for this, the sensitivity analysis presented here includes introducing agricultural 
liberalisation in the pre-experiment. Since the results show that this does not substantially 
modify the assessed impact on non-agricultural liberalisation, our assumption that it is 
worthwhile to study non-agricultural market access separately is validated, even though the 
negotiation covers a wide variety of other topics.  
                                                 
7 See for instance Lippoldt & Kowalski (2003) on trade facilitation. 4 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model used to simulate the scenarios. 
Section 3 presents the experiment design and stresses how the baseline has been defined. 
Section 4 presents the results of the simulations. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis. 
Section 6 draws the first conclusions. 
2. The  model 
This section gives a brief overview of the CGE model used, namely a static version of the 
MIRAGE model.
8 The main characteristics of the model concern the assumptions made about 
the quality ranges of the products, imperfect competition and macroeconomic closure.  
2.1 Demand 
The demand side is modelled in each region through a representative agent, whose utility 
function is intra-temporal, with a fixed share of the regional income allocated to savings and the 
rest used to purchase final consumption.
9 Below this first-tier Cobb-Douglas function, 
consumption trade-off across sectors is represented through a LES-CES function. Each sectoral 
sub-utility function is a nesting of CES functions, comparable to the standard nested 
Armington-Dixit-Stiglitz function (see e.g. Harrison et al., 1997), with two exceptions. First, 
domestic products are assumed to benefit from a specific status for consumers, making them 
less substitutable with foreign products than foreign products are among each other. Second, 
products originating in developing countries and in developed countries are assumed to belong 
to different quality ranges. This is motivated by the fact that, following Abd-el-Rahman (1991), 
several empirical works have shown that even at the most detailed level of classification 
(Combined Nomenclature, 10 digits, including more than 10,000 products), unit value 
differences are able to reveal quality differences (see e.g. Fontagné et al., 1998; Greenaway & 
Torstensson, 2000). In addition, this specialisation is closely linked to education and wealth 
levels, and “the share of intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated products increases with 
the economic distance between countries” (Fontagné et al., 1998, p. 10). Based on a very 
detailed analysis of US imports, Schott (2004, p. 647) also emphasises the importance of 
“within-product” specialisation, i.e. vertical differentiation along the quality ladder, as revealed 
by unit value differences. Schott shows that “unit values within products vary systematically 
with exporter relative factor endowments and exporter production techniques”.  
This is likely to have direct consequences on the transmission of liberalisation shocks since, as 
shown in particular by Fontagné & Freudenberg (1999), the elasticity of substitution is lower 
across different qualities than across products within a given quality. In the absence of 
systematic information suitable for incorporation in a worldwide modelling exercise such as the 
one undertaken here, vertical differentiation is modelled in an ad hoc fashion: developed 
countries and developing countries are assumed to produce goods belonging to two different 
quality ranges; substitutability is assumed to be weaker across these two quality ranges than 
between products belonging to the same quality range. Practically, this is modelled by 
introducing in the demand nesting a tier corresponding to the trade-off between the two quality 
ranges. This tier is the first one in the range of consumer choice within each sector, ahead of any 
other choice in terms of geographical origin.  
                                                 
8 A list of the equations for the model is provided in the Appendix. For a detailed presentation, see Bchir 
et al. (2002). 
9 The structure of the demand function is shown in Appendix 6. INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 5 
 
2.2 Supply 
Production makes use of five factors: capital, labour (skilled and unskilled), land and natural 
resources. The first three are generic factors; the last two are specific factors. The production 
function assumes perfect complementarity between value added and intermediate consumption. 
The sectoral composition of the intermediate consumption aggregate stems from a CES 
function. For each sector of origin, the nesting is the same as for final consumption, meaning 
that the sector bundle has the same structure for final and intermediate consumption.  
The structure of value added is intended to take into account the well-documented skill-capital 
relative complementarity. These two factors are thus bundled separately, with a lower elasticity 
of substitution (0.6), while a higher substitutability (elasticity 1.1) is assumed between this 
bundle and other factors.  
Constant returns to scale and perfect competition are assumed to exist in agricultural sectors. In 
contrast, firms are assumed to face increasing returns to scale (through a constant marginal cost 
and a fixed cost, expressed in output units) in industry and services. In those sectors, firms 
compete  à la Cournot, with zero conjectural variations, no Ford effect and no strategic 
interaction. Each firm enjoys some market power and sets its mark-up depending on the extent 
of product differentiation in the sector, but also according to its own market share. This 
modelling captures the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation. 
2.3  Capital, markets clearing and macroeconomic closure  
The capital good is the same whatever the sector and capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile 
across sectors within each region. At the regional level, capital stock is assumed to be constant 
in the core simulations of this paper. Nevertheless, given the potentially high welfare impact of 
the assumption made in this respect (see e.g. Francois et al., 1995), the sensitivity analysis 
includes an alternative modelling where the real interest rate is held constant, while region-wide 
capital stock is endogenous.  
Natural resources are considered to be perfectly immobile and may not be accumulated. Both 
types of labour, as well as land, are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors. Production 
factors are assumed to be fully employed. All production factors are internationally immobile. 
With respect to macroeconomic closure, the current balance is assumed to be exogenous (and 
equal to its initial value in real terms), while real exchange rates are endogenous.  
3.  Pre-experiment simulation and experiment design  
The measurement of border protection and the computation of actual liberalisation resulting 
from a tariff-cutting formula used in this study bring substantial improvements compared with 
previous work. Our simulations are based upon a measurement of ad valorem equivalent 
protection resulting from ad valorem and specific (including compound and mixed) duties, 
together with tariff rate quotas (TRQs), at the six-digit level of the harmonised system (hereafter 
HS-6 level), for 163 countries and 208 partners in 2001, drawn from the MAcMap 2001 6 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
(version 1) database.
10 The distinctive feature of this database is that it takes into account all 
enforced preferential agreements (reciprocal as well as non-reciprocal).
11  
But WTO negotiations deal with consolidated, not applied protection. The difference is sizeable. 
In order to properly assess the possible impact of a given cut in bound tariffs, a worldwide 
database of AVE bound duties has been put together for the purpose of this study. Based on the 
WTO’s Consolidated Tariff Schedule database, as well as on countries’ notifications and 
additional national sources, AVEs (ad valorem and specific) of bound tariffs have been 
calculated at the HS-6 level for all WTO members. Consolidation commitments that are not yet 
in force are also taken into account. Special emphasis has been put on ensuring the consistency 
with the AVE applied tariffs used.
12 
Both applied and bound protection are thus consistently and accurately measured at the HS-6 
product level, making it possible to simultaneously account for trade preferences, the binding 
overhang and the non-linearity of the formula.  
Before considering any liberalisation scenario, we account for the commitments made but not 
implemented in 2001 and commitments made by recently acceded countries. This is done 
through a pre-experiment simulation. Indeed, while the base year of our data is 2001, any 
agreement in the Doha Round is unlikely to be enforced before 2007 (at best). The pre-
experiment simulation aims at filling this gap by taking into account planned changes in policy 
variables (see e.g. Francois & Martin, 2003). In the present case, it includes the following 
shocks:  
•  the EU’s enlargement in 2004 – the 10 acceding countries are supposed to adopt the 
Common External Tariff and face the same tariffs as the EU before 2004; 
•  the dismantling of the Multi-Fibre Agreement – the corresponding quota rents are removed; 
•  entry of newly acceded members to the WTO (including China). Their exports are assumed 
to face no more than the MFN tariff in each market (this change is also assumed to hold for 
Russia, Algeria and Libya, the accession of which we take for granted). Their tariffs are also 
liberalised according to the commitments made upon their accession, as reflected in their 
consolidated tariff schedules; and 
•  the full application of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In 2001, only 
a few African countries were qualified to benefit from this Act, whereas the majority of 
them will be qualified in 2005. Accordingly, we adopt a simplifying assumption, by 
assuming that sub-Saharan African countries face zero protection in the US market.
13 
The equilibrium of the world economy obtained as a result of this pre-experiment simulation is 
used as the baseline for subsequent simulations.  
                                                 
10 Market Access Map (MAcMap) is a database of trade barriers jointly developed by the International 
Trade Centre (ITC) and CEPII. A detailed presentation of the methodology used in calculating ad 
valorem equivalents is presented in Bouët et al. (2004) (retrievable from http://www.cepii.fr). 
11 We use an aggregation method based on imports by groups of countries. Five groups of countries are 
considered, as a result of a hierarchical clustering analysis on PPP GDP per capita and on trade openness. 
See Bouët et al. (2004) for details. This minimises the extent of the well-known endogeneity bias that 
arises when bilateral imports are used as a weighting scheme in order to aggregate tariffs.  
12 See Bchir et al. (2005) for details on the methodology used to compute AVE bound duties. 
13 The protection planned in AGOA is not zero for all products, and this assumption may be considered as 
an optimistic proxy for the effect of AGOA; however, assuming that 2001 levels of protection hold in 
2005 would probably be worse.  INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 7 
 
Unless otherwise stated (i.e. in scenario (g) below), the scenarios have considered cut bound 
duties. This means that for each product, the bound duty is first cut according to the formula 
considered. The new applied duty is then computed as the minimum between the initial applied 
duty and the liberalised bound duty. Thus, as indeed will be the case in any WTO agreement, 
applied duties are lowered only insofar as the new bound duty is low enough to be constraining. 
When the initial bound duty is substantially higher than the applied duty, as is often the case in 
developing countries, the applied duty could well remain unchanged. This calculation is made 
separately for each HS-6 product. New applied duties are then aggregated in the model’s 
classification. 
The scenarios considered are the following (the liberalisation hypotheses are only applied to 
non-agricultural products, according to the WTO definition, and only among WTO member 
countries):   
(a)  Elimination of tariff peaks – specifically peak tariffs in non-agricultural products, i.e. 
ad valorem equivalent tariffs above 15% are replaced by a 15% AVE tariff; 
(b)  Complete liberalisation – tariffs are completely removed for all non-agricultural 
products; 
(c)  Girard 0.65 – Girard’s proposal, using coefficient B = 0.65; 
(d)  Girard 1 – a tariff cut according to the formula included in Girard’s proposal, using 
coefficient B = 1; 
(e)  Girard 2 – Girard’s proposal, using coefficient B = 2; 
(f)  Girard 1+SDT – special and differential treatment is introduced into scenario (d). In 
the Girard formula that is applied to the tariffs of developing countries that have 
consolidated at least 35% of their tariff lines, the coefficient B takes the value B = 2; 
and finally,  
(g)  Girard 1 on the applied tariff – applied (rather than bound) tariffs are cut according to 
the formula of scenario (d). 
 
Scenario (a) corresponds to “eliminating excessive protection”, in the words of Hoekman et al. 
(2002a). Scenario (b) is given for the sake of comparison.  
The last four scenarios correspond to variants of the tariff-cutting formula proposed by 
Ambassador Girard (WTO, 2003b). This formula is defined as: 
0
0
1 T t B
T t B
T
a
a
+ ×
× ×
=
 
where T0 and T1 refer respectively to the initial and final base duty. B is a coefficient common to 
all countries, and ta is the simple average of ad valorem equivalent base rates across non-
agricultural products. ‘Base rates’ are defined as bound rates or, for unbounded duties, as twice 
the MFN applied rate (with a minimum of 5%). For duties that are initially unbound, this 
formula thus entails both binding protection and lowering the level of the binding. An important 
and original device of this formula is that, for a given initial base rate, the higher the initial 
average protection level in a country (as measured through base rates) the less the tariff cut 
applies. 
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In accordance with the July 2004 Framework Agreement (see WTO, 2004, Annex B, paras. 6 
and 9), we assume in each scenario that least developed countries and those with binding 
coverage of non-agricultural tariff lines of less than 35% should not be required to liberalise 
their market access. The Agreement states that they shall only be required to commit to extend 
their level of binding commitments,
14 but this should not have any direct impact on their level of 
applied duties. 
In order to keep the model tractable and to allow for a large regional breakdown, we limit our 
analysis to 20 sectors, with a focus on non-agricultural goods, in particular those where huge 
swings in protection levels have to be expected (such as wearing apparel or leather). Here 22 
regions are considered: the EU-25, the US, Japan, Canada, Mexico, ANZCERTA,
15
 Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Korea, the Tigers, South Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, SACU, 
the rest of the sub-Saharan African countries (hereafter SSA), the Maghreb, Russia, the EFTA, 
Turkey and the rest of the world
16 (see details in Appendix 1).  
The initial average protection for these regions in our benchmark (i.e. after the pre-experiment 
changes) is shown in Table 1. Three groups of exporters, respectively the industrialised, 
intermediate and poorest countries, are considered separately while measuring this average 
protection. The differences in protection faced by these three groups may be linked to 
preferential agreements, to differences in unit values (which influence the AVE of specific 
tariffs)
17 and to differences in export specialisation.
18  
Without exception, protection is highest in the textiles/clothing/leather/shoes sector (hereafter 
referred to as ‘textiles/clothing’ for the sake of simplicity) than for the rest of non-agricultural 
products, irregardless of the country or group of partners. Protection in this sector is seldom less 
than 10% and is frequently above 15%. In a given market, developing countries rarely encounter 
less protection than rich ones. On the contrary, in several instances the protection faced by 
developing countries is higher, owing to their specialisation in low unit-value exports (for which 
specific tariffs have a higher AVE) and in products on which protection is higher (of course, this 
is likely to be endogenous). This situation also reflects the fact that many of the preferential 
schemes that are applied to developing countries exclude a large share of textile/clothing 
products.  
                                                 
14 The July 2004 Framework Agreement also allows developing countries to benefit from special and 
differential treatment, by defining a list of products for which lesser commitments will be made. Given 
the difficulty of figuring out the products retained in practice when using this additional flexibility, this 
clause is not taken into account here.  
15
 ANZERTA refers to the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. 
16 The rest of the world is treated in a similar manner as other regions in terms of tariffs, since we have 
information on roughly all countries (208 in total).  
17 Note, however, that specific duties are not used for non-agricultural products, especially for those 
outside the textile/clothing sector, except in Switzerland, Sri Lanka and Thailand. See for example 
Bacchetta & Bora (2003 and 2004).  
18 As previously mentioned, sector specialisation is accounted for here through the export structure of the 
exporting country towards the reference group of the importing country. INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 9 
 
Table 1. Initial average protection for non-agricultural products (AVE tariff duty, %) 
Textile-wearing, from: Other industrial prod., from:
Industrialised ctries
Developing ctries
Poorest ctries 
world
Industrialised ctries
Developing ctries
Poorest ctries 
world
Industrialised ctries 8.0 7.5 5.2 7.5 2.3 1.0 0.7 2.0
of which: EU25         8.1 6.7 3.2 6.7 2.6 0.9 0.3 2.1
Japan        9.3 9.5 5.9 9.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5
US           9.1 10.3 12.3 9.7 1.7 0.9 1.3 1.6
ANZCERTA    13.1 16.1 16.3 14.3 3.7 3.2 2.7 3.6
Canada       11.2 12.6 14.6 11.9 2.3 0.8 1.3 2.1
EFTA         0.9 4.1 4.3 2.2 0.5 1.3 5.5 0.6
HKTaSgp      2.5 2.9 3.1 2.7 3.1 1.7 1.1 2.9
Korea        10.6 11.4 10.8 10.9 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.8
Developing ctries 14.3 19.3 15.8 15.4 8.7 10.4 11.4 8.9
of which: Argentina    19.4 18.4 19.7 19.1 13.1 11.9 12.8 12.9
Brazil       18.4 18.2 17.1 18.3 13.1 12.3 11.9 13.0
China        10.7 11.1 8.8 10.7 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.7
INDIA        30.4 30.5 22.9 30.3 28.1 31.0 29.4 28.6
Maghreb      46.7 73.6 37.6 51.2 15.4 17.0 17.5 15.6
Mexico       15.6 27.1 27.7 19.5 8.8 13.0 14.2 9.4
Row          9.4 14.3 15.9 10.8 5.9 6.8 7.2 6.0
RSAm         13.0 12.9 12.8 13.0 8.1 8.1 7.7 8.1
Russia       14.7 16.1 16.1 15.2 10.1 9.0 10.4 10.0
SACU         25.0 27.5 24.6 25.8 6.1 6.3 3.6 6.1
Tigers       14.0 15.1 11.8 14.2 9.2 10.3 7.0 9.3
Turkey       4.9 12.3 7.9 6.1 1.3 4.7 2.5 1.8
Poorest ctries  20.7 23.6 25.7 21.8 11.3 12.3 11.9 11.4
of which: AFR          24.6 24.1 24.7 24.4 10.8 11.6 13.6 10.9
SouthAsia    19.7 23.4 27.7 21.0 11.5 12.5 11.2 11.7
World        10.1 8.5 5.8 9.1 3.8 2.3 2.7 3.5  
Notes: Row headings indicate markets; country groups in the columns indicate exporters. ‘Developing 
ctries’ refers to developing countries other than those included in the ‘poorest’ group. Calculations 
are based on specific tariffs, converted using reference groups’ unit values (see text for details). 
Sources: MAcMap database and authors’ calculations. 
For other non-agricultural products, protection in industrialised countries is very low (in most 
cases below 4%), in particular with respect to the poorest countries,
19 although differences 
across partners remain limited. The contrast is strong among developing countries, which apply 
quite substantial protection for these products. Average protection in other industrial products 
reaches 10% in Argentina, Brazil, the Maghreb, SSA and South Asia, and is as high as almost 
30% in India.  
                                                 
19 ANZCERTA stands as a clear exception to this rule, owing to its substantial protection in products of 
interest for poor countries. 10 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
In sum, average protection is clearly less in industrialised countries than in developing countries 
and higher in the poorest countries. Beyond this general pattern, the Maghreb
20 and most of all 
India stand out as the most protectionist areas.  
Given these large initial disparities in protection patterns, the liberalisation scenarios considered 
have quite different implications across countries (see Table 2; more detailed results are given in 
Appendix 3). Note first that owing to special provisions for LDCs and countries with a low 
scope of binding, SSA and South Asian countries are almost entirely exempted from 
undertaking any liberalisation, whatever the scenario.  
Table 2. Resulting average protection level for non-agricultural products, by liberalisation 
scenario and by market (AVE applied tariff duty, %) 
Initial base tariff
Initial applied Tarif 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Total liberalization 
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 4.5 2.5 2.3 0.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.1
of which: EU25         4.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.3
Japan        1.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5
US           2.6 2.2 2.1 0.0 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.8
ANZCERTA    11.4 4.5 4.1 0.1 2.8 3.2 3.5 2.5
Canada       4.2 2.9 2.8 0.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.3
EFTA         6.5 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
HKTaSgp      8.9 2.9 1.6 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.7
Korea        13.2 5.3 5.3 0.1 3.3 4.0 4.9 3.1
Developing ctries 23.2 9.5 7.3 1.2 6.3 7.1 8.0 6.0
of which: Argentina    32.9 13.3 11.8 0.3 10.5 12.2 13.3 9.1
Brazil       30.8 13.5 11.5 0.2 10.0 11.7 12.9 8.9
China        8.1 7.1 6.4 0.2 2.9 3.6 4.7 3.5
INDIA        41.0 28.7 13.6 1.0 15.1 18.9 24.4 16.5
Maghreb      36.8 19.0 10.1 0.3 13.2 15.6 16.9 13.3
Mexico       35.3 10.0 8.1 0.4 7.8 8.9 9.6 6.8
Row          30.1 8.5 7.9 1.4 7.1 7.6 8.0 6.2
RSAm         20.8 6.4 6.1 4.2 5.8 6.0 6.1 5.6
Russia       20.7 10.3 9.4 0.1 7.7 8.9 9.8 6.5
SACU         17.6 7.5 5.4 0.2 3.7 4.2 4.9 3.5
Tigers       23.8 9.7 6.1 0.2 5.1 5.8 6.5 4.8
Turkey       13.7 2.2 1.9 0.1 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.5
Poorest ctries  30.5 12.2 12.1 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.1 12.0
of which: AFR          36.1 11.7 11.5 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.4
SouthAsia    28.2 12.5 12.4 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.3
World        8.5 4.0 3.4 0.4 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.2 
Notes: For details about the implementation of the scenarios, see the text. Scenario (f) is not reported, but 
its results can be inferred directly from scenarios (d) and (e).  
Sources: MAcMap database and authors’ calculations.  
 
                                                 
20 The Maghreb includes Algeria, Libya and Egypt, which are not WTO members. These countries trade 
relatively little, however, and as a consequence their protection is weakly weighted when calculating the 
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The elimination of tariff peaks has virtually no impact on industrialised countries’ protection, 
except in textile/clothing in Canada, the US and ANZCERTA. In developing countries, the 
removal of tariff peaks mainly results in lower protection in textiles and clothing. The only 
regions
21 where the impact is important are the Maghreb and India.
22  
Applying the Girard formula with a coefficient of B = 1 has a more widespread impact on 
protection. In developed countries, average protection for industrial products is approximately 
halved, with a stronger cut in textiles/clothing, for which the harmonising effect is significant. 
The decline on average tariff duties is weaker in relative terms in developing countries, but it is 
stronger in absolute terms. This tariff-cutting formula also entails a strong harmonising effect 
across developing countries, especially in textiles/clothing, where the resulting average 
protection does not exceed 20% (except in India and the Maghreb).  
The impact of such a tariff-cutting formula on applied protection strongly depends on the extent 
of the initial binding overhang. As emphasised above, applied tariffs are only lowered insofar as 
the liberalised bound tariff becomes less than the initial applied tariff. The extent to which the 
cuts in bound duties are actually transmitted to applied duties is illustrated by comparing the 
impact of the standard Girard formula (coefficient B = 1, scenario (d)), with the same formula, 
but cutting directly applied duties (scenario (g)). This does not make a significant difference as 
far as developed countries are concerned, except for Korea. By contrast, for developing 
countries directly cutting applied duties delivers far greater liberalisation, thus showing that the 
rather large initial binding overhang significantly dampens the impact of the tariff-cutting 
formula. For intermediate countries as a whole, a Girard formula of directly cutting applied 
tariffs would lower average applied protection in industrial products by 3.5 percentage points 
(6.1 points in textiles/clothing and 2.7 points in other products), while the cut only reaches 2.4 
points (4.7 points in textile/clothing and 1.7 points elsewhere) when the formula is applied to 
bound tariffs. For some countries, the binding overhang absorbs the bulk of the liberalising 
effect of the formula. For Argentina, for instance, applied protection is cut by 1.1 points if the 
Girard formula is used on bound rates, while it would be cut by 4.2 points if the formula directly 
cut applied tariffs. The situation is similar for Brazil. 
How much difference does choosing a different B coefficient make when applying the Girard 
formula? The answer is that the higher the initial average protection in a country (and hence the 
coefficient ta used in the formula), the higher the sensitivity of the result with regard to this 
coefficient. For rich countries, the initially low average protection rate in non-agricultural 
products implies that the outcome hardly depends on the value of B. This is far from being the 
case for developing countries, particularly for countries such as India, those in the Maghreb, 
Argentina and Brazil. India is the extreme case: while a Girard formula using B = 0.65 almost 
halves average protection, using B = 2 instead cuts initial applied duties by less than 15% on 
average.  
It is worth noting that deepening cuts by lowering the B coefficient from 1 to 0.65 makes a 
difference of comparable importance for most developing countries, as with the switch from 2 
to 1. While a limited liberalisation is largely absorbed by the binding overhang (the cut in 
 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless, had SSA and South Asia not been exempted from any commitment, the impact would 
also be significant (around 3 percentage points) for these two regions.  
22 It is notable that the average tariff duty resulting from the removal of tariff peaks remains greater than 
15% in India for textiles and clothing. This result stems from the fact that some of the products included 
in these GTAP sectors are classified in the WTO nomenclature as agricultural products, and are 
accordingly excluded from the liberalisation scenario considered here.  12 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
applied tariffs is far less than in bound tariffs), this is not true of additional liberalisation. This 
magnifies the link between the depth of liberalisation and the balance between developed and 
developing countries.  
4. Simulation  results 
The scenarios considered have widespread and contrasting effects. In order to be as specific as 
possible in the first step, we focus on the impact of a Girard formula using coefficient B = 1 
(scenario (d)). The analysis will then be extended to the other scenarios.  
4.1  The impact of applying the Girard formula with coefficient B = 1  
Multilateral liberalisation is generally expected to increase import prices, at least on those 
products experiencing the greatest liberalisation. Lowered trade barriers increase the world 
demand for imports, therefore inducing an upward pressure on their prices. Yet this is not the 
case here as a result of applying the Girard formula with the coefficient B = 1 (Table 3). On the 
contrary, world import prices decline for most industrial products, and in particular for textiles, 
clothing and motor vehicles, which are among the most-protected industrial products around the 
world. The extent of the international division of labour in place in the majority of industrial 
sectors helps to explain this finding. Imported intermediate inputs account for a substantial share 
of the total cost of many products. For most producers, lowered tariff duties thus mean cheaper 
intermediate inputs and hence lower production costs.
23 When import prices are only measured 
based on the price of value added, the broad picture is reversed: in accordance with the standard 
theoretical analysis, the prices of value added
24 incorporated in world imports increases for all 
the industrial sectors. This price increase is very moderate, however, not exceeding 0.35% 
except for textiles, clothing and leather, and reaching 0.45% as a maximum (for electronic 
products).  
These price changes lead to a slight terms-of-trade improvement for industrialised countries 
(+0.07% on average), benefiting in particular Asian developed countries (+0.49% in Japan, 
+0.46% in Korea and +0.29% for Hong Kong/Taiwan/Singapore), but leading to a slight 
deterioration in North America (-0.25% in Canada and -0.24% in the US). In contrast, there is a 
general if limited (0.10% for intermediate countries) deterioration in the terms of trade for 
developing countries, with the sole exceptions of China and Russia. As a result of their high 
initial level of protection, India (-1.61%) and the Maghreb (-0.83%) experience the most 
significant deterioration.  
                                                 
23 Arguably, the tariff escalation observed in many cases is likely to dampen the extent of this mechanism. 
Although tariffs are measured at a very detailed level, the social accountancy matrices used are rather 
aggregated. It is thus likely that tariff escalation is poorly measured here.  
24 This calculation is based on the value added by the exporting sector, i.e. by the value added of the last 
production stage. A more complete calculation is of course possible, but it is very demanding in terms of 
computation. In addition, carrying out such a calculation based on the data used here would lack 
accuracy, since the data does not take into account the difference in the import ratio between the final and 
intermediate goods for each sector.  INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 13 
 
Table 3. Effects of applying the Girard proposal (using coefficient B = 1) on world import 
prices, as measured through output and value-added prices, and impact on industrial 
exports (% change) 
world import prices
World 
exports     
measured 
through 
output prices
measured 
through value 
added prices
World 
exports     
Primary     
of wich: Progcrops    -0.10  -0.04  0.5
OtherAg      -0.02  0.09 1.2
Livestock    -0.01  0.05 0.4
Primary      -0.07  0.08 1.6
Manufacturing
of wich: Textiles     -0.26  0.38 11.0
Wearing      -0.42  0.38 16.7
Leather      -0.13  0.36 9.5
WoodPap     -0.07  0.08 1.0
Chem         -0.02  0.18 3.2
FerMetals    0.08 0.23 1.2
MetalsNec    -0.12  0.13 2.2
MetalProd    0.06 0.21 2.3
MotorVeh     -0.24  0.19 6.8
TrspEqNec   -0.04  0.12 1.2
Electronic   0.25 0.45 -0.3 
Machinery    0.05 0.19 1.5
OtherManuf -0.05  0.20 2.7
Services
of wich: ServOth      0.09 0.17 0.1
Transp       0.02 0.13 0.1
BusServ      0.07 0.12 0.0  
Notes: The world GDP price is used as the numeral. For each sector, the average price of value added 
incorporated in imports is calculated as the average of value-added prices across producing 
countries, weighted by world exports. All price indices are computed as Fischer indices. 
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
Given the trade balance constraint, changes in industrial imports and exports are closely linked. 
Industrial trade is strongly increased in those countries where initial protection is high, such as 
India, the Maghreb and SACU (Table 4). It is also significantly raised in countries with a strong 
competitive position in industrial products taken as a whole, in particular China, Japan and 
Korea. SSA and South Asia, mostly enveloping countries exempted from any requirements, do 
not experience any significant increase in industrial imports. But nor do they benefit from any 
increase in industrial exports; on the contrary, their industrial exports decrease slightly. Indeed, 
these countries initially benefit from widespread preferential schemes in their main markets, 
either directed towards Africa (by the EU under the Cotonou Agreement or by the US under the 
AGOA) or directed towards LDCs, as mentioned previously. For these two regions, multilateral 
liberalisation does not involve much improvement in market access – it is most of all 
synonymous with eroded preferences.   
EFTA, Turkey, Canada and Mexico are characterised by very weak or negative import creation. 
Involved in a deep preferential trade arrangement with a large neighbour, these countries had 
already largely opened their domestic market for industrial products.  Since these arrangements 
are reciprocal, the mirror image of this effect is a low increase or even a decrease in industrial 
exports, since for these countries multilateral liberalisation entails an erosion of preferences on 
their main export markets.  14 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
Table 4. Effects of applying the Girard proposal (using coefficient B = 1) on industrial added 
value, industrial exports, industrial imports, terms of trade and welfare (% change) 
Industrial added 
value
industrial exports
industrial imports 
Terms of trade
Wefare
Industrialised ctries 0.04 2.85 2.80 0.07 0.04
of which: EU25         -0.00  2.90 3.59 0.09 0.03
Japan        0.34 4.07 5.01 0.49 0.14
US           -0.07  2.92 2.51 -0.24  0.01
ANZCERTA    0.29 7.98 3.90 0.04 0.15
Canada       -0.57  -0.92  -0.10  -0.25  -0.06 
EFTA         -0.44  0.34 0.93 -0.05  0.02
HKTaSgp      1.18 2.81 1.50 0.29 0.11
Korea        0.66 4.45 5.66 0.46 0.35
Developing  ctries -0.01 3.95 4.29 -0.15 0.03
of which: Argentina    -0.14  2.60 2.28 -0.09  -0.00 
Brazil       -0.41  2.71 3.34 -0.28  -0.02 
China        0.61 5.97 8.74 0.04 -0.37 
INDIA        0.13 10.93 15.12 -1.61  -0.15 
Maghreb      -6.53  8.92 6.02 -0.83  1.96
Mexico       -0.24  0.24 0.75 -0.34  -0.02 
Row          -0.58  -0.08  0.92 -0.20  -0.02 
RSAm         -0.03  3.56 1.88 -0.11  -0.03 
Russia       -0.16  2.69 2.72 0.05 0.14
SACU         0.02 7.20 7.74 -0.13  0.09
Tigers       1.00 3.89 4.79 -0.01  0.17
Turkey       -0.18  -0.21  0.32 -0.09  0.04
Poorest      -0.38  -0.57  0.14 -0.12  -0.02 
of which: AFR          -0.46  -1.04  0.16 -0.15  -0.04 
SouthAsia      -0.27 -0.05  0.07 -0.03 -0.00 
World        0.03 3.15 3.19 -0.00  0.04  
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
On the whole, the increase in world trade in industrial products is rather weak (+3.2% on 
average). Quite strikingly, it is concentrated in a handful of sectors: clothing (+16.7%), textiles 
(+11.0%), leather (+9.5%), motor vehicles (+6.8%) and chemicals (+3.2%) are the only sectors 
where world exports are increased by more than 3%. Yet in some cases these rather low 
aggregate figures hide a significant reshuffling of industrial activity worldwide, in particular for 
the above-mentioned sectors. In the clothing sector, for instance, Asian countries strongly 
benefit from the liberalisation, with value added in this sector increased by 12 to 18% in China, 
the Tigers, Korea and Hong Kong/Taiwan/Singapore, and by almost 20% in India. In contrast, 
value added in the clothing sector is halved in the Maghreb countries, and it is reduced by more 
than 10% in Canada and Mexico. Here again, the erosion of preferences is the main reason for 
this sharp downsizing of the clothing sector, which would require a substantial adjustment from 
the Maghreb economies in particular. In textiles, the so-called ‘Dragons’ (Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Singapore) record a substantially increased value added, mainly at the expense of 
Canada, SACU, ANZCERTA and Mexico. In the leather/shoes sector, valued added is increased 
by 11% in China and by 9% in the Tigers, while a steep decrease is observed in Japan and 
SACU, and to a lesser extent in South Asia, Canada, Russia and the US. The motor vehicles 
sector also experiences substantial changes, with Korea and Japan (already large producers) 
increasing their value added by 12% and 8% respectively. In contrast, value added in this sector 
declines by more than 25% in Hong Kong/Taiwan/Singapore and by 15% in the Tigers. In this INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 15 
 
reshuffling of industrial market shares, Asian countries thus play a prominent role, illustrating 
the strong offensive interests of China and the Tigers in light industry, and of Korea and Japan 
in motor vehicles.  
As measured through equivalent variation, worldwide income gains appear to be very limited 
(+0.04%). Among developed countries, Asian countries are the main gainers, which is 
unsurprising given their strong competitive positions in the world trade of industrial products. 
These gains mainly stem from improved access to export markets and entail sizeable gains in 
terms of trade, as illustrated by the decomposition of welfare gains (see Appendix 5). ‘Offensive 
interests’ are thus dominant here, in particular as far as Asian developed countries are 
concerned. The number of domestic firms generally rises, thus increasing the variety of goods 
available to consumers, who in addition also benefit from easier access to foreign goods 
(although this effect is weak, owing to the limited magnitude of initial protection). In the 
production of non-agricultural goods characterised by increasing returns to scale, increased 
output also translates into efficiency gains. Canada is the only loser among developed countries, 
because of deteriorated terms of trade stemming from eroded preferences in North American 
markets.  
Among developing countries, the outcome is far more contrasted. The Maghreb countries enjoy 
a strong income gain (almost +2%), and Russia, SACU, the Tigers and Turkey record slight 
gains. Yet all the other developing countries suffer from an income loss as a result of this 
liberalisation, in most cases due to a deterioration of their terms of trade. Although these losses 
are of a low order of magnitude, this result is quite striking, particularly compared with those 
observed for developed countries.  
The results for India and the Maghreb may seem puzzling. While these regions are the two most 
protectionist and present some similarities in their export structure (strongly oriented towards 
textiles and clothing), they exhibit opposite outcomes: India features as the greatest loser, 
whereas the Maghreb is the greatest winner.
25 The explanation for this is mainly twofold. First, 
liberalisation entails higher consumer gains in the Maghreb because initial protection is very 
inefficient, with not only a high average level, but also with strong variations across products 
and partners. Liberalisation thus entails strong allocative efficiency gains for the Maghreb 
countries (+1.7% of equivalent variation), which is far less the case for India (+0.3%). Second, 
the adjustment in India entails a large output decrease in several fragmented sectors (chemistry, 
ferrous and metal products, other metal products, motor vehicles, other transport equipment and 
wood and paper). Since these are sectors where adjustment takes place mainly through changes 
in the number of firms and varieties, this leads to a large decrease in the number of domestic 
varieties, with negative consequences for consumers’ surplus (-0.3% of equivalent variation is 
owing to factors other than terms of trade and allocative efficiency). 
The income loss observed for China is an unexpected result, given the strong offensive interests 
of the Chinese economy in the industrial sector (as illustrated by the increased value added in 
this sector) when trade is liberalised in our central scenario. But the country does not earn any 
significant gains in terms of trade, because of the tough price competition among developing 
countries (most of which experience a depreciation of their real exchange rates) that China 
encounters in its main export sectors (textile and clothing in particular). Meanwhile, China is 
reducing its output in numerous sectors where the previously protected domestic industry had 
 
                                                 
25 In addition, it should be noted that the Maghreb region is heterogeneous. Algeria and Libya are not 
WTO members and exhibit high protection levels. Although Morocco and Tunisia account for the bulk of 
the region’s foreign trade, this could blur the analysis. 16 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
offered a wide range of varieties. The specialisation in other sectors is associated with a more 
limited number of varieties, hence explaining the welfare loss. Relying on perfect competition 
would make this effect vanish, as we check for below.  
4.2  Comparing the outcome under various scenarios 
A complete liberalisation of trade in non-agricultural products (scenario (b)) would increase 
world trade in volume by 9% (see Appendix 3). This is six times as much as the increase 
resulting from the elimination of tariff peaks and approximately three times more than under the 
Girard proposal. The difference in outcomes across the application of the Girard proposal with 
different B coefficients remains limited at the world level: world trade is increased by 4% with a 
coefficient of 0.65, by 3% with a coefficient equal to unity and by 2% with a coefficient of 2. 
Lastly, applying the liberalisation formula on applied tariffs rather than on bound tariffs leads to 
an overestimation of the trade creation effects of the liberalisation in the range of 20%. 
The distribution of industrial import creation across countries closely follows the hierarchy of 
initial protection: the highest import increases are recorded in the Maghreb and in India (with 
respectively a 48% and a 45% increase in volumes following complete liberalisation). Argentina 
and Brazil record a 28% and a 23% trade increase respectively. Logically, these high-protection 
countries are also those where the choice of a B coefficient in the Girard formula matters most. 
Indian imports increase by 16% in volume with B = 0.65, compared with only 4% for B = 2. 
South Korea and ANZCERTA are the only developed regions where the import surge reaches a 
magnitude in line with what is recorded for developing economies. On the whole, the largest 
trade increases are recorded for intermediate developing countries: 13% with complete 
liberalisation, compared with 7% for industrialised countries. Under this benchmark scenario, 
however, the volume of exports of the poorest countries would decline by 1%. Only 
liberalisation limited to an elimination of the tariff peaks would allow these countries to increase 
their exports. 
Since the current balance is held constant, the effects observed on exports are necessarily 
closely linked to those on imports (see Appendix 4). Any ex ante import surge over and above 
the export increase would entail real depreciation and hence further (industrial and agricultural) 
export growth. This explains why strong export growth is recorded in countries such as India 
and those in the Maghreb, not because liberalisation would ex ante create a strong increase in 
the foreign demand for their products.  
Complete liberalisation translates into a 0.6% increase in the terms of trade of industrialised 
countries (Table 5). In contrast, developing countries record a 1.3% deterioration and LDCs a 
0.6% deterioration. Accordingly, the results of our central scenario are magnified. With a 
coefficient of 0.65 for the Girard formula this impact is smoothed (respectively +0.1 / -0.3 / -
0.2), and even more so with a coefficient of 2 (respectively – 0.0 / +0.0 / - 0.1). Lastly, 
introducing an SDT (scenario (f)) profoundly modifies the results for intermediate developing 
countries: their terms of trade are slightly improved in this case, particularly to the benefit of 
Argentina, China, Russia and the Tigers. Countries that were facing extensive worsening in their 
terms of trade, such as India, also find their losses are sharply limited. INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 17 
 
Table 5. Effects on terms of trade, by region (% change) 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 0.16 0.61 0.14 0.07 -0.01 -0.04  0.15
of which: EU25         0.25 0.81 0.17 0.09 0.01 -0.03  0.24
Japan        0.23 1.58 0.67 0.49 0.29 0.37 0.63
US           0.08 -0.01  -0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.31 -0.19 
ANZCERTA    0.22 -0.25  0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.01  -0.09 
Canada       -0.01  -0.29  -0.26 -0.25 -0.21 -0.27 -0.23 
EFTA         -0.01  0.11 -0.04  -0.05  -0.07  -0.09  -0.02 
HKTaSgp      0.12 1.20 0.43 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.39
Korea        0.25 0.96 0.52 0.46 0.40 0.30 0.46
Developing  ctries -0.35 -1.33 -0.31 -0.15  0.02 0.08 -0.34 
of which: Argentina    -0.28  -2.25  -0.38  -0.09  0.09 0.13 -0.61 
Brazil       -0.48  -2.49  -0.61 -0.28 -0.00  0.06 -0.76 
China        -0.05  -0.53  -0.07  0.04 0.21 0.35 0.03
INDIA        -3.22  -5.99  -2.43 -1.61 -0.47 -0.42 -2.22 
Maghreb      -1.92  -4.28  -1.32 -0.83 -0.57 -0.56 -1.34 
Mexico            -0.34 -1.93 -0.53 -0.34 -0.16 -0.16 -0.57 
Row          -0.19  -1.26  -0.31 -0.20 -0.11 -0.10 -0.39 
RSAm         -0.24  -1.90 -0.25 -0.11  0.02 0.04 -0.48 
Russia       -0.15  -0.65  -0.03  0.05 0.10 0.16 -0.17 
SACU         0.10 -0.50  -0.15 -0.13 -0.18 -0.16 -0.30 
Tigers       -0.28  -0.79 -0.11 -0.01  0.11 0.18 -0.14 
Turkey            0.05 -0.36 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 
Poorest          -0.09 -0.56 -0.18 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 -0.17 
of which: AFR          -0.09  -0.63 -0.21 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.22 
SouthAsia      -0.07 -0.34 -0.09 -0.03  0.05 0.02 -0.03 
World              -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01   
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
The impact on terms of trade is thus detrimental to developing countries when liberalisation is 
significant, while this is not the case for lesser tariff cuts. This results from an association with 
high initial protection levels and a significant binding overhang. Beyond a certain tariff cut, any 
further liberalisation is almost directly transmitted to applied duties, even in developing 
countries. In this case, the higher initial protection rate of developing countries translates into 
larger tariff cuts in absolute terms, as compared with developed countries. For developing 
countries liberalisation thus entails higher ex ante import than export creation. A real 
depreciation is therefore necessary in order to maintain the current account balance. But many 
developing countries share a similar specialisation, with the textile/clothing sector playing a key 
role. In addition, their export products belong to the same quality range, which is reflected in 
our model through a higher substitutability between them. As a result, the exporters in 
developing countries are close competitors. This means that the real depreciation of other 
developing countries substantially reduces the competitive advantage each country draws from 
its own depreciation, hence the need for further depreciation.  
Such terms-of-trade losses are expected for these net industrial importers with a high initial 
protection level, such as the Maghreb and India, as well as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to a 
lesser extent. As a result of this increased competition among developing countries, however, 
even countries such as China or the Tigers also suffer from terms-of-trade deterioration when 
implementing ambitious scenarios such as the Girard proposal with a coefficient of 0.65 or full 
liberalisation.  18 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
Table 6. Effects on welfare, per country (equivalent variation, % change) 
Initial level (GDP)
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 2415 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06
of which: EU25         765 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06
J a p a n         4 0 10 . 0 50 . 3 30 . 1 70 . 1 40 . 1 00 . 1 20 . 1 6
US           1009 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01  0.02
ANZCERTA    39 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12
Canada            66 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
EFTA         39 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
HKTaSgp      52 0.11 0.67 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.18
Korea        43 0.18 0.63 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.35
Developing ctries 572 0.04 -0.50  -0.02  0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.03 
of  which: Argentina      26 -0.02 -0.51 -0.05 -0.00  0.01 0.02 -0.10 
Brazil       46 -0.05  -0.54  -0.08  -0.02  0.02 0.03 -0.11 
China              115 -0.13 -0.86 -0.44 -0.37 -0.27 -0.25 -0.39 
INDIA              47 -0.38 -1.11 -0.27 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 
Maghreb      23 2.18 1.02 1.91 1.96 1.94 1.94 2.01
Mexico            62 0.03 -0.48 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
Row          100 0.00 -0.32  -0.05  -0.02  0.00 0.00 -0.07 
RSAm         58 -0.03  -0.62  -0.06  -0.03  -0.00  0.00 -0.13 
Russia       30 0.00 -0.02  0.15 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10
SACU         11 0.21 -0.21  0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.01 
Tigers       42 -0.07  -0.78  0.08 0.17 0.29 0.36 0.05
Turkey       14 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Poorest          30 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
of which: AFR          20 0.01 -0.11  -0.05  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  -0.05 
SouthAsia      10 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.00  0.02 0.01 0.00
World        3017 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04  
Note: Initial levels are expressed in tens of $US billions for 2001. 
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
As evidenced by a decomposition of welfare gains, this deterioration in terms of trade plays a 
key role in explaining the welfare losses found for many developing countries as soon as 
ambitious liberalisation is undertaken and for almost all of them when liberalisation is complete. 
Although positive in most cases, allocative efficiency gains do not counterbalance this loss. 
Accordingly, a comparison of scenarios (a) to (e) points out the increasingly uneven impact of 
more ambitious liberalisation scenarios. India is a good illustration of this: the welfare loss is  
–0.15% in our central scenario (Table 6). It doubles when we use the parameter 0.65 instead of 
unity in the Girard formula. It is even four times as large with complete liberalisation, whereas 
the welfare loss becomes negligible with a coefficient of 2 in the Girard formula. This highly 
uneven distribution of welfare changes among countries and across scenarios will therefore lead 
to challenging issues for negotiators, if the objective of an ambitious round favouring 
development is to be pursued. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that although almost all of them are exempted from any liberalisation 
commitment, SSA countries are adversely affected in welfare terms in all the scenarios, with the 
exception of the elimination of tariff peaks. This loss, of limited amount, is the result of 
preference erosion (in particular for textiles and clothing in the EU and US markets) and of the 
relative price decline of their main export products (primary and agricultural products).  INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 19 
 
5. Sensitivity  analysis 
The type of broad assessment carried out in the previous sections calls for a careful sensitivity 
analysis. In what follows, we use as a baseline the results obtained in the simulation of the 
Girard proposal (with a coefficient of 1) described above (scenario (c)).  
The first issue is trade elasticities. The values used in our benchmark simulations are those used 
in the GTAP model
26 (Hertel, 1997). As pointed out for instance by Harrison et al. (1997), 
differences in (Armington-type) substitution elasticities strongly influence the assessed impact 
of multilateral liberalisation, not only in terms of trade but also regarding welfare, and it is 
arguable whether higher elasticities should not be used. To test for the sensitivity of the results 
in the present case, an alternative simulation is carried out using doubled values for all 
substitution elasticities between products in the model. A ‘back of the envelope’ calculation 
would double the change in world exports if one doubles the elasticity.  
The impact on world import prices of such change is negligible in most non-agricultural sectors. 
The exception is labour-intensive products that have high initial protection: textiles, clothing 
and leather, where doubling the elasticity translates into larger price increases than in the central 
scenario. This larger response of trade flows translates into more contrasting changes in 
industrial value added: higher increases in ANZCERTA, Hong Kong/Taiwan/Singapore, Korea, 
China and the Tigers and steeper decreases in South America and poor countries. Accordingly, 
this change in the parameterisation of the model slightly magnifies the uneven nature of the 
welfare changes across regions, with a more favourable outcome for intermediate countries, but 
a worsened impact on poor countries.  
An alternative departure from our initial set of assumptions is to switch from imperfect to 
perfect competition, while keeping the vertical differentiation of products. By getting rid of 
increasing returns and variety effects, the corresponding simulation (reported in the third 
column of Tables 7 to 9) allows several issues referred to above to be clarified. Perfect 
competition is associated with larger price increases than in our central scenario, and this 
change is the most pronounced for those sectors that were initially highly protected, namely 
textiles, clothing and leather, where the price increase can be twice as large under perfect 
competition. Another significantly impacted sector is other manufacturing, including light 
industries mostly exported by developing economies. Regarding welfare, abandoning the 
imperfect competition mostly affects China, which recovers a positive welfare change; this is 
consistent with the above-mentioned negative impact of the decreased number of domestic 
varieties in the default setting. The Tigers record a higher welfare gain. LDCs are also (even 
modestly) on the positive side now and African losses are wiped out. 
Another possible change in the structure of the model is to get rid of the vertical differentiation 
of products. Our default model assumes that products are differentiated according to their origin 
(north or south) into two qualities (high or low). One could criticise such assumptions on the 
grounds of intra-firm trade, international sub-contracting, outsourcing practices, etc. After all, 
one does not care where his/her sportswear has been produced, if it is the fashionable brand. We 
thus report the impact relaxing this assumption while keeping imperfect competition. This 
results in a significantly improved welfare gain for China, Hong Kong/Singapore/Taiwan and 
India; the poorest countries in South Asia and Africa are also now on the positive side. By 
contrast, this sensitivity analysis illustrates the role potentially played by differences in quality 
ranges between developed and developing countries: as long as developing countries are 
                                                 
26 More specifically, for each sector, the Armington elasticity of substitution used in the GTAP model to 
describe the sourcing choice among different origins (including the domestic one) is used here as the 
default value to describe the sourcing among various foreign providers.  20 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
producing low quality goods, they are mainly competing among themselves. Insofar as 
liberalisation results in an ex ante negative competitive shock for most of them, the real 
depreciation required to maintain a balanced current account is higher, because it is shared by 
close competitors, thus limiting the substitution effect. 
Table 7. Compared effects on world import prices, as measured through value-added prices of 
the Girard proposal (B = 1) under different model specifications (% change) 
Mirage 
Sigma x 2
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
K endog
Mirage, after agric lib'n
Primary     
on wich: Progcrops    -0.04  0.02 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04
OtherAg      0.09 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.09
Livestock    0.05 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 -0.03 
Primary      0.08 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.07
Manufacturing
on wich: Textiles     0.38 0.53 0.65 0.67 0.45 0.40
Wearing      0.38 0.59 0.82 0.81 0.57 0.37
Leather      0.36 0.45 0.77 0.76 0.57 0.36
WoodPap     0.08 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.07
Chem         0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.19
FerMetals    0.23 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.23
MetalsNec    0.13 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.11
MetalProd    0.21 0.22 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.20
MotorVeh     0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.22
TrspEqNec   0.12 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.12
Electronic   0.45 0.50 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.43
Machinery    0.19 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.19
OtherManuf 0.20 0.22 0.42 0.40 0.23 0.20
Services
on wich: ServOth      0.17 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.17
Transp       0.13 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.12
BusServ      0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.11  
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
 
So far, we have assumed capital stock to be fixed. If we instead assume that each economy’s 
capital stock is endogenous, while the real return to capital is held constant, the results are 
significantly altered in relation to the ex ante impact on the marginal productivity of capital. 
This magnifies changes in industrial value added. At the world level, the increase in value added 
is twice as large with endogenous capital. The changes are the most pronounced in Asian 
industrialised economies. This contrasts with the negative change observed in North America. 
Regarding intermediate developing economies, such a change in the assumption magnifies the 
observed negative impact on value added. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are the most affected; 
India, which was recording an increase in its value added, now faces the opposite evolution as a 
result of a negative trend in the return to capital. The poorest countries also face additional 
losses, for similar reasons. In total, endogenising capital formation emphasises the uneven 
nature of the changes in industrial value added at the world level. In welfare terms, gains are 
magnified in the north (noticeably in Asia), as are welfare losses in the poorest countries. 
Intermediate developing economies are generally worse off, with the exception of China, the 
Tigers, Russia and SACU. INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 21 
 
Table 8. Compared effects of the Girard proposal (B = 1) on terms of trade under different 
model specifications (% change) 
Mirage 
Sigma x 2
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
K endog
Mirage, after agric lib'n
Industrialised ctries 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
of which: EU25         0.09 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09
Japan        0.49 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.53
US           -0.24  -0.26  -0.30  -0.32  -0.25  -0.24 
ANZCERTA    0.04 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.11 
Canada       -0.25  -0.24  -0.23  -0.20  -0.25  -0.24 
EFTA         -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  0.02 -0.05  -0.07 
HKTaSgp      0.29 0.34 0.40 0.47 0.30 0.32
Korea        0.46 0.49 0.56 0.61 0.46 0.51
Developing  ctries -0.15 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 
of  which: Argentina      -0.09 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 
Brazil       -0.28  -0.21  -0.22  -0.24  -0.24  -0.31 
China        0.04 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.02
INDIA        -1.61  -1.51  -1.59  -1.82  -1.61  -1.38 
Maghreb      -0.83  -0.46  -0.84  -0.84  -0.80  -0.78 
Mexico       -0.34  -0.19  -0.36  -0.34  -0.30  -0.34 
Row          -0.20  -0.16  -0.15  -0.09  -0.16  -0.19 
RSAm         -0.11  -0.12  -0.00  0.01 -0.10  -0.12 
Russia       0.05 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04
SACU         -0.13  -0.06  -0.38  -0.42  -0.12  -0.17 
Tigers       -0.01  -0.01  0.02 0.00 -0.07  -0.04 
Turkey       -0.09  0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.07  -0.07 
Poorest      -0.12  -0.11  0.05 0.13 -0.10  -0.11 
of which: AFR          -0.15  -0.11  -0.04  0.02 -0.13  -0.14 
SouthAsia    -0.03  -0.13  0.28 0.44 -0.02  -0.03 
World        -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
 
Finally, the results could also be sensitive to the design of the simulation exercises, and not to 
the structure of the model or its parameterisation. Indeed, we consider trade liberalisation in 
non-agricultural products alone, while negotiations concern other aspects and in particular 
agricultural products. This may influence the assessment, mainly because agricultural 
liberalisation has an impact on trade specialisation and on the sectoral allocation of resources. In 
order to control this possible influence, while still focusing on the item of the agenda we are 
interested in, we introduce agricultural liberalisation in the pre-experiment. All instruments of 
protection in agriculture (tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies) are halved in all 
countries in the pre-experiment. This last change hardly affects the results. Such an outcome 
does not mean that there are no additional gains from liberalising agriculture; however, these 
gains are incorporated in the pre-experiment, not in the simulation. But the results do show that 
separately studying agricultural and non-agricultural products does not introduce any significant 
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Table 9. Compared welfare effects of the Girard proposal (B = 1) under different model 
specifications, per country (equivalent variation, % change) 
Mirage 
Sigma x 2
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
K endog
Mirage, after agric lib'n
Industrialised ctries 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.04
of which: EU25         0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.03
Japan        0.14 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.65 0.14
US           0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.13  0.01
ANZCERTA    0.15 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.44 0.08
Canada            -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.33 -0.06 
EFTA         0.02 0.07 0.12 0.16 -0.01  0.09
HKTaSgp      0.11 0.16 0.27 0.33 0.88 0.12
Korea        0.35 0.53 0.46 0.54 2.07 0.31
Developing ctries 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.18 -0.10  0.02
of which: Argentina    -0.00  0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.14  -0.01 
Brazil       -0.02  0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.29  -0.04 
China        -0.37  -0.38  0.15 0.16 0.27 -0.37 
INDIA        -0.15  0.20 0.05 0.11 -1.71  -0.14 
Maghreb      1.96 3.23 1.70 2.01 1.82 1.99
Mexico       -0.02  0.11 -0.04  -0.03  -1.57  -0.02 
Row          -0.02  0.06 -0.01  0.03 -0.25  -0.03 
RSAm         -0.03  -0.01  0.03 0.05 -0.14  -0.03 
Russia       0.14 0.25 0.14 0.20 0.40 0.15
SACU         0.09 0.39 -0.00  0.05 1.13 0.09
Tigers       0.17 0.69 0.44 0.55 2.48 0.13
Turkey       0.04 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02
Poorest      -0.02  -0.16  0.03 0.07 -0.14  -0.03 
of which: AFR          -0.04  -0.24  0.01 0.04 -0.17  -0.04 
SouthAsia    -0.00  -0.00  0.08 0.14 -0.09  0.00
World        0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides the first study of the stakes involved in multilateral liberalisation of non-
agricultural market access, which properly takes account of the actual structure of protection at 
the detailed level, for both bound and preferential duties. As previously emphasised by, for 
instance, Francois & Martin (2004), lowered bound duties involve a gain in themselves. Yet the 
actual impact on applied duties is far from proportional, being another example of a trade policy 
issue where ‘the devil is in the details’. Our simulations show that the detailed design of the 
tariff-cutting formula can matter a lot, particularly with regard to the sharing of welfare gains. 
On the one hand, weak liberalisation would hardly modify applied protection in developing 
countries, because of the large binding overhang in these countries. On the other hand, 
ambitious liberalisation would spur price competition between developing countries’ exporters, 
who are often specialised in similar products and quality ranges, resulting in terms-of-trade 
losses for a number of them. And changing coefficient B in Girard’s formula from 2 down to 
0.65 appears to be enough to switch the results from the first to the second case. Seemingly 
secondary issues or technicalities may thus significantly impact the outcome.  
Additional gains arising from the conclusion of the Doha Round, especially those associated 
with agriculture and services should be kept in mind. Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis 
carried out in this study validates the assumption that market access to non-agricultural products 
can be assessed independently of agricultural liberalisation without significant bias.  
As far as economic analysis is concerned, various aspects deserve further research. In particular, 
our work shows the importance of properly accounting for differences in product quality. This 
domain is one is which improvements would be most welcome in terms of applied analysis.   | 23 
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Appendix 1. Sector aggregation 
Table A.1. Aggregation by sector 
Sectors (type of competition)  GTAP sector (code) 
Progcrops (perfect)  Paddy rice (pdr), Wheat (wht), Cereal grains nec (gro) 
OtherAg (perfect)  Vegetables, fruit, nuts (v_f) 
Progcrops (perfect)  Oil seeds (osd), Sugar cane, sugar beet (c_b), Plant-based fibres (pfb), 
Crops nec (ocr) 
Livestock (perfect)  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses (ctl), Animal products nec (oap), Raw milk 
(rmk) 
OtherAg (perfect)  Wool, silk-worm cocoons (wol), Forestry (for), Fishing (fsh) 
Primary (perfect)  Coal (col), Oil (oil), Gas (gas), Minerals nec (omn) 
Livestock (imperfect)  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse (cmt), Meat products nec (omt) 
OtherAg (imperfect)  Vegetable oils and fats (vol) 
Livestock (imperfect)  Dairy products (mil) 
Progcrops (imperfect)  Processed rice (pcr), Sugar (sgr) 
OtherAg (imperfect)  Food products nec (ofd), Beverages and tobacco products (b_t) 
Textiles (imperfect)  Textiles (tex) 
Wearing (imperfect)  Wearing apparel (wap) 
Source: Authors. 
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Appendix 2. Geographical aggregation 
Table A.2. Aggregation by region 
Region in the model  GTAP country (code) 
ANZCERTA  Australia (aus), New Zealand (nzl) 
China China  (chn) 
HKTaSgp  Hong Kong (hkg) 
Japan Japan  (jpn) 
Korea Korea  (kor) 
HKTaSgp Taiwan  (twn) 
Tigers  Indonesia (idn), Malaysia (mys), Philippines (phl) 
HKTaSgp Singapore  (sgp) 
Tigers Thailand  (tha) 
SouthAsia  Vietnam (vnm), Bangladesh (bgd) 
INDIA India  (ind) 
SouthAsia  Sri Lanka (lka), Rest of South Asia (xsa) 
Canada Canada  (can) 
US  United States (usa) 
Mexico Mexico  (mex) 
RSAm  Central America, Caribbean (xcm), Colombia (col), Peru (per), Venezuela 
(ven), Rest of Andean Pact (xap) 
Argentina Argentina  (arg) 
Brazil Brazil  (bra) 
RSAm  Chile (chl), Uruguay (ury), Rest of South America (xsm) 
EU-25  Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Denmark (dnk), Finland (fin), France (fra), 
Germany (deu), United Kingdom (gbr), Greece (grc), Ireland (irl), Italy 
(ita), Luxembourg (lux), Netherlands (nld), Portugal (prt), Spain (esp), 
Sweden (swe) 
EFTA  Switzerland (che), Rest of European Free Trade Area (xef) 
RoW  Albania (alb), Bulgaria (bgr), Croatia (hrv) 
EU-25  Czech Republic (cze), Hungary (hun), Malta (mlt), Poland (pol) 
RoW Romania  (rom) 
EU-25  Slovakia (svk), Slovenia (svn), Estonia (est), Latvia (lva), Lithuania (ltu) 
Russia  Russian Federation (rus) 
RoW  Rest of Former Soviet Union (xsu) 
EU-25 Cyprus  (cyp) 
Turkey Turkey  (tur) 
RoW  Rest of Middle East (xme) 
Maghreb  Morocco (mar), Rest of North Africa (xnf) 
AFR Botswana  (bwa) 
SACU  Rest of South Afr C Union (xsc) 
AFR  Malawi (mwi), Mozambique (moz), Tanzania (tza), Zambia (zmb), 
Zimbabwe (zwe), Other Southern Africa (xsf), Uganda (uga), Rest of sub-
Saharan Africa (xss) 
RoW  Rest of world (xrw) 
Source: Authors. 
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Appendix 3. Resulting average protection level for each liberalisation scenario 
Table A.3 Average protection level for liberalisation scenarios by market (AVE tariff duty, %) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Industrialised ctries 6.6 2.7 8.3 3.1 8.1 3.2 2.4 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.6 1.0 2.3 1.4 5.7 2.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.4 1.0 1.8 0.9
of which:  EU25         5.9 2.8 7.2 3.2 7.4 3.6 2.6 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.8 1.0 2.1 1.4 7.1 3.3 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.3 0.9
Japan        6.2 2.6 9.1 3.2 16.1 4.2 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.4 0.8
US           8.7 2.2 10.8 2.6 10.0 2.6 2.3 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.9 2.2 1.0 3.1 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.8 1.8 0.7
ANZCERTA     11.9 6.1 20.5 8.8 8.5 6.0 2.9 2.5 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.3 1.5 1.1 5.8 4.5 9.2 6.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.5
Canada       10.1 3.5 15.3 4.2 9.8 3.6 3.0 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 3.3 2.0 4.6 2.4 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.5 1.1 2.3 1.3
EFTA         2.5 1.1 2.7 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 12.5 0.3
HKTaSgp      2.5 1.2 3.4 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.8 1.0 0.6 0.4 2.2 1.2 12.0 1.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6
Korea        10.1 6.8 12.4 7.6 10.0 6.0 5.6 3.8 2.1 1.7 0.7 0.5 4.6 3.7 7.1 5.4 8.2 6.9 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.0 6.2 4.7 5.8 4.2
Developing ctries 13.5 10.0 22.9 12.8 13.4 9.8 9.0 7.2 8.9 7.4 9.1 7.6 8.5 6.8 11.7 9.3 19.0 10.9 5.5 4.4 4.5 4.1 8.1 6.6 13.6 9.8
of which:  Argentina    18.4 16.0 21.2 16.6 17.3 14.3 12.8 11.3 13.0 12.3 13.1 13.0 8.1 8.0 17.4 15.9 18.1 15.4 5.8 5.5 9.1 8.8 14.6 14.0 18.7 15.6
Brazil       18.2 15.8 21.4 16.4 15.1 12.8 11.3 10.0 11.7 11.1 12.8 12.5 8.5 8.3 16.8 15.4 25.4 14.8 4.7 4.5 11.3 10.7 13.5 12.7 18.4 15.4
China        9.7 4.8 15.5 6.2 10.7 6.0 6.9 4.4 3.8 2.5 4.9 3.4 3.9 2.7 9.3 4.6 17.6 6.0 4.7 3.0 1.8 0.8 7.0 3.9 15.5 5.5
INDIA        29.5 20.1 34.6 22.6 31.2 23.6 33.6 23.0 28.0 20.2 34.7 22.8 33.3 22.2 33.7 24.6 54.3 25.6 21.0 12.0 3.0 2.2 25.4 17.8 33.5 25.2
Maghreb      32.4 26.8 154.8 56.3 29.6 27.8 16.4 15.3 23.0 21.6 14.4 13.8 13.8 13.4 23.4 21.0 34.0 27.3 7.4 5.9 9.8 8.7 12.7 11.5 23.9 19.8
Mexico       15.0 11.7 25.6 13.8 24.9 14.9 10.2 9.2 9.4 8.6 12.8 11.8 7.1 7.0 11.3 10.0 12.8 11.7 7.4 6.9 5.5 5.2 9.8 9.3 16.5 12.4
Row          10.0 8.9 14.1 10.1 8.4 7.7 5.0 4.8 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.3 4.6 4.5 8.0 7.5 8.2 7.7 5.2 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.9 5.7 7.9 6.8
RSAm         12.0 9.8 17.0 14.6 12.3 10.9 7.6 7.0 9.3 8.5 8.0 6.9 7.0 6.7 10.4 9.2 15.0 12.2 5.2 4.7 6.0 5.8 7.3 6.8 14.1 12.5
Russia       12.3 10.2 19.5 13.8 17.8 11.7 9.6 8.7 13.0 10.6 6.6 6.1 11.7 9.2 13.6 11.1 12.0 9.5 14.1 10.7 8.6 8.3 8.5 7.8 16.2 12.0
SACU         21.5 9.7 37.1 12.5 21.3 9.7 5.8 3.7 8.1 5.3 5.1 4.7 2.3 1.9 7.6 5.4 21.2 10.6 0.4 0.2 1.9 1.4 3.7 2.9 9.4 4.6
Tigers       13.2 9.7 21.3 11.8 8.7 5.8 8.0 6.0 9.3 6.5 8.8 7.3 5.5 4.1 12.9 9.4 39.4 14.4 2.6 2.1 1.4 1.1 5.4 4.3 10.4 7.7
Turkey       6.2 4.7 6.4 5.1 5.4 4.7 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 7.3 5.7 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 2.8 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.3 1.9
Poorest      19.8 19.6 31.5 30.4 22.0 21.7 9.7 9.7 15.7 15.7 10.5 10.5 4.7 4.7 15.6 15.6 29.0 27.9 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.2 9.2 9.1 24.5 24.4
of which:  AFR          18.7 17.8 40.9 37.4 28.6 27.2 9.5 9.3 16.7 16.4 11.3 11.2 7.7 7.6 15.5 15.3 19.5 18.3 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.9 9.6 9.5 26.7 26.3
SouthAsia    20.1 20.1 27.2 27.2 19.9 19.9 9.8 9.8 15.4 15.4 10.3 10.3 4.2 4.2 15.7 15.7 33.9 32.9 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 9.0 8.9 23.4 23.4
World        8.5 4.8 9.8 4.2 8.9 4.2 4.0 2.9 2.2 1.7 3.0 2.4 2.8 1.9 4.4 3.3 8.0 3.8 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.1 3.1 2.4 3.0 1.9
OtherManuf MotorVeh TrspEqNec Electronic Machinery WoodPap FerMetals MetalsNec MetalProd Textiles Wearing Leather Chem
 
Notes: (1) = Initial applied duties; (2) = Girard 1. 
Sources: MAcMap database and authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 4. Detailed simulation results 
Table A.4.1. Effects on industrial exports (in volume), per country (% change) 
 
Initial level
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 180.5 0.81 7.31 3.56 2.85 2.04 2.59 3.37
of which: EU25         53.0 0.86 8.65 3.82 2.90 1.93 2.52 3.60
Japan        31.0 1.10 9.55 4.96 4.07 2.94 3.74 4.62
US           45.0 0.36 5.34 3.35 2.92 2.33 2.84 2.92
ANZCERTA    2.2 5.11 19.87 9.34 7.98 6.70 7.78 9.69
Canada       14.3 -0.34  -0.92  -0.99  -0.92  -0.72  -0.98  -0.79 
EFTA         7.4 0.61 0.48 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.26 0.41
HKTaSgp      16.1 1.87 7.59 3.43 2.81 2.25 2.36 3.72
Korea        11.6 0.76 14.52 6.20 4.45 2.35 4.10 6.00
Developing ctries 79.0 2.51 12.53 5.05 3.95 2.78 2.93 5.18
of which: Argentina    0.7 3.53 27.59 5.40 2.60 0.13 0.22 7.50
Brazil       2.7 2.07 23.12 4.90 2.71 1.23 1.58 6.76
China        27.0 0.59 12.36 7.19 5.97 4.24 4.58 6.34
INDIA        2.9 17.66 45.31 16.27 10.93 4.41 4.59 15.27
Maghreb      1.0 34.79 48.34 13.51 8.92 6.40 5.56 13.83
Mexico       10.0 1.35 7.09 0.78 0.24 -0.02  -0.08  1.42
Row          7.7 0.04 0.06 -0.25  -0.08  0.17 0.07 0.24
RSAm         3.3 1.33 16.57 4.48 3.56 2.93 2.99 6.16
Russia       3.3 1.04 13.09 4.21 2.69 1.35 1.71 4.79
SACU         1.9 6.45 17.54 8.86 7.20 5.00 4.91 8.10
Tigers       16.6 3.03 10.98 4.51 3.89 3.47 3.66 5.22
Turkey       1.8 2.02 4.25 -0.01  -0.21  -0.01  -0.34  0.78
Poorest      2.1 0.17 -1.35  -0.86  -0.57  -0.16  -0.54  -0.39 
of which: AFR          1.1 0.36 -1.93  -1.38  -1.04  -0.57  -1.08  -0.94 
SouthAsia      1.0 -0.04 -0.71 -0.28 -0.05  0.31 0.07 0.21
World        261.6 1.32 8.82 3.97 3.15 2.25 2.67 3.88  
Note: Initial levels are expressed in tens of $US billions (in 1997). 
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Table A.4.2. Effects on industrial imports (in volume), per country (% change) 
 
Initial level
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 190.2 0.65 6.68 3.43 2.80 2.07 2.63 3.21
of which: EU25         47.4 0.72 9.70 4.63 3.59 2.48 3.31 4.18
Japan        17.2 1.20 11.18 6.04 5.01 3.70 4.63 5.54
US           73.0 0.36 4.67 2.88 2.51 2.01 2.43 2.60
ANZCERTA    4.7 1.82 10.68 4.69 3.90 3.15 3.83 5.11
Canada       14.0 -0.17  0.32 -0.08  -0.10  -0.06  -0.16  0.02
EFTA         7.9 0.83 1.58 0.99 0.93 0.83 0.84 1.04
H K T a S g p       1 8 . 7 1 . 2 93 . 7 01 . 7 31 . 5 01 . 3 71 . 3 72 . 0 4
Korea        7.3 0.72 19.31 7.95 5.66 2.69 5.32 7.85
Developing ctries 76.9 3.06 14.95 5.67 4.29 2.87 2.98 5.89
of which: Argentina    1.3 2.51 27.60 5.24 2.28 0.19 0.28 7.88
Brazil       3.6 3.09 25.19 6.10 3.34 1.27 1.40 7.80
China        17.3 0.96 18.31 10.55 8.74 6.19 6.58 9.27
INDIA        2.4 24.96 58.37 22.39 15.12 5.77 5.90 20.01
Maghreb      2.9 17.42 32.58 9.50 6.02 4.28 4.19 9.65
Mexico       8.8 1.56 9.17 1.49 0.75 0.32 0.30 2.11
Row          14.9 0.61 3.74 1.17 0.92 0.65 0.63 1.47
RSAm         7.5 1.06 12.72 2.65 1.88 1.27 1.30 4.20
Russia       3.1 1.49 14.75 4.31 2.72 1.35 1.47 5.61
SACU         1.6 5.49 18.03 9.24 7.74 5.91 5.91 8.96
Tigers       11.3 4.23 13.88 5.61 4.79 4.10 4.20 6.43
Turkey       2.1 0.82 3.71 0.54 0.32 0.28 0.20 0.99
P o o r e s t       4 . 0 0 . 2 00 . 0 50 . 1 20 . 1 40 . 1 70 . 1 00 . 1 6
of which: AFR          3.1 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.15
S o u t h A s i a     0 . 9 0 . 2 10 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 70 . 1 40 . 0 20 . 1 9
World        271.0 1.33 8.92 4.02 3.19 2.27 2.69 3.93  
Note: Initial levels are expressed in tens of $US billions. 
Source: Authors’ simulations.  30 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
 
Table A.4.3. Compared effects on industrial added value of the Girard proposal (B = 1) under 
different model specifications, per country (% change in volume) 
 
Mirage 
Sigma x 2
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
K endog
Mirage, after agric lib'n
Industrialised ctries 0.04 0.18 -0.00  -0.04  0.10 0.04
of which: EU25         -0.00  0.03 -0.04  -0.09  0.01 -0.01 
Japan        0.34 0.80 0.22 0.28 0.70 0.34
US           -0.07  -0.07  -0.13  -0.22  -0.21  -0.08 
ANZCERTA    0.29 3.28 -0.13  -0.44  0.46 -0.39 
Canada            -0.57 -1.22 -0.54 -0.63 -0.84 -0.61 
EFTA                -0.44 -0.90 -0.51 -0.56 -0.51 -0.46 
HKTaSgp      1.18 2.49 1.50 1.79 2.09 1.35
Korea        0.66 1.57 0.76 0.90 2.09 0.78
Developing  ctries -0.01  0.12 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.00 
of  which: Argentina      -0.14 -0.35 -0.37 -0.46 -0.28 -0.21 
Brazil            -0.41 -0.69 -0.54 -0.78 -0.74 -0.56 
China        0.61 1.30 0.74 0.86 1.00 0.65
INDIA        0.13 -0.05  -0.09  -0.56  -1.75  0.05
Maghreb          -6.53 -7.59 -6.61 -7.38 -6.64 -6.37 
Mexico            -0.24 -0.38 -0.42 -0.51 -1.71 -0.29 
Row                  -0.58 -1.12 -0.49 -0.57 -0.88 -0.61 
RSAm         -0.03  -0.43  0.15 0.02 -0.20  -0.04 
Russia            -0.16 -0.09 -0.57 -0.90 -0.03 -0.01 
SACU         0.02 0.46 -0.66  -1.10  0.72 0.03
Tigers       1.00 1.55 0.94 0.81 2.60 1.26
Turkey       -0.18  0.12 -0.04  0.17 -0.27  -0.28 
Poorest          -0.38 -0.92 -0.04  0.09 -0.58 -0.41 
of which: AFR          -0.46  -0.93  -0.29  -0.34  -0.74  -0.55 
SouthAsia      -0.27 -0.92  0.29 0.65 -0.37 -0.24 
World        0.03 0.16 -0.01  -0.06  0.06 0.03  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
 INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 31 
 
Table A.4.4. Effects on world import prices measured through output prices (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(f) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Primary     
on  wich: Progcrops      -0.17 -0.84 -0.21 -0.10 -0.00  0.00 -0.24 
OtherAg      -0.11  -0.47  -0.08  -0.02  0.03 0.04 -0.11 
Livestock      0.01 -0.21 -0.04 -0.01  0.02 0.00 -0.05 
Primary          -0.13 -0.77 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 
Manufacturing
on wich: Textiles     -0.27  -0.98 -0.37 -0.26 -0.12 -0.12 -0.34 
Wearing          -0.48 -1.57 -0.59 -0.42 -0.21 -0.17 -0.54 
Leather      -0.19  -0.89  -0.24  -0.13  -0.01  0.03 -0.24 
WoodPap      -0.01  -0.25  -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 
Chem         -0.02  -0.15  -0.04  -0.02  0.00 -0.00  -0.04 
FerMetals    -0.05  -0.26  0.05 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.00
MetalsNec      -0.11 -0.77 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.24 
MetalProd    -0.03  -0.09  0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.03
MotorVeh        -0.08 -0.51 -0.27 -0.24 -0.20 -0.25 -0.27 
TrspEqNec      0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
Electronic   -0.02  0.15 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.19
Machinery    0.04 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
OtherManuf    -0.23 -0.54 -0.13 -0.05  0.04 0.07 -0.11 
Services
on wich: ServOth      0.07 0.33 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.13
Transp       -0.02  -0.01  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
BusServ      0.04 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.11  
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Table A.4.5. Effects on world import prices measured through value-added prices (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Primary     
on wich: Progcrops    -0.15  -0.62  -0.13  -0.04  0.04 0.05 -0.15 
OtherAg      -0.02  -0.08  0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.05
Livestock    0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03
Primary      -0.01  -0.14  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.04
Manufacturing
on wich: Textiles     -0.01  0.85 0.45 0.38 0.30 0.37 0.45
Wearing      -0.08  0.51 0.41 0.38 0.33 0.42 0.39
Leather      -0.05  0.49 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.37
WoodPap      0.05 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.12
Chem         0.07 0.60 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.25
FerMetals    0.05 0.52 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.26
MetalsNec    0.08 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11
MetalProd    0.05 0.61 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.27
MotorVeh     0.13 0.72 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.27
TrspEqNec    0.09 0.50 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.18
Electronic   0.14 1.18 0.56 0.45 0.34 0.41 0.56
Machinery    0.10 0.63 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.26
OtherManuf   -0.08  0.33 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.22
Services
on wich: ServOth      0.11 0.59 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.24
Transp       0.07 0.34 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.16
BusServ      0.08 0.42 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.18  
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Table A.4.6. Effects on real unskilled wages, by region (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06
of which:  EU25         0.06 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07
Japan        0.07 0.52 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.24
US           0.01 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03 
ANZCERTA    0.16 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07
Canada            -0.03 -0.26 -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 
EFTA         0.02 0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.00  -0.01  0.03
HKTaSgp      0.11 1.34 0.58 0.43 0.25 0.30 0.52
Korea        0.27 1.04 0.71 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.60
Developing ctries 0.01 -0.78  -0.10  -0.01  0.07 0.10 -0.11 
of which:  Argentina    -0.02  -0.61  -0.05  0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.13 
Brazil       -0.19  -1.11  -0.24  -0.10  0.00 0.03 -0.30 
China              -0.10 -0.92 -0.38 -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 -0.31 
INDIA        -0.33  -0.86  -0.12  -0.02  0.08 0.10 -0.05 
Maghreb      2.43 0.80 1.69 1.82 1.83 1.81 1.82
Mexico            -0.00 -0.76 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 
Row                  -0.11 -0.82 -0.19 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.24 
RSAm         -0.09  -1.05  -0.12  -0.05  0.00 0.01 -0.25 
Russia       -0.12  -0.52  0.07 0.11 0.13 0.20 -0.07 
SACU                -0.05 -0.90 -0.26 -0.19 -0.13 -0.12 -0.33 
Tigers       -0.11  -1.05  -0.02  0.10 0.28 0.35 -0.05 
Turkey       0.03 -0.14  -0.02  -0.01  0.02 0.02 -0.04 
Poorest      -0.03  -0.17  -0.04  -0.02  0.01 0.01 -0.04 
of which:  AFR          -0.03  -0.23  -0.07  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.07 
SouthAsia    -0.02  -0.04  0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04
World        0.04 -0.01  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
 34 | BCHIR, FONTAGNÉ & JEAN 
 
Table A.4.7. Effects on real skilled wages, by region (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(g) Girard 1 + SDT
(f) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.10
of which:  EU25         0.06 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09
Japan        0.10 0.68 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.33
US           0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
ANZCERTA    0.14 -0.13  0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.00
Canada            -0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 
EFTA         0.04 0.25 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.10
HKTaSgp      0.01 0.73 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.19
Korea        0.26 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.37
Developing  ctries 0.03 -0.95 -0.11 -0.02  0.07 0.09 -0.14 
of which:  Argentina    -0.00  -1.08  -0.10  0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.25 
Brazil       -0.18  -1.28  -0.24  -0.09  0.02 0.04 -0.32 
China              -0.19 -1.51 -0.77 -0.64 -0.47 -0.43 -0.68 
INDIA        -0.50  -1.28  -0.26  -0.12  0.03 0.06 -0.16 
Maghreb      2.95 1.32 2.52 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.67
Mexico       0.10 -0.49  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05
Row                  -0.06 -0.75 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 
RSAm                -0.08 -1.18 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.29 
Russia       -0.10  -0.47  0.13 0.16 0.15 0.24 -0.03 
SACU                -0.05 -1.10 -0.29 -0.20 -0.12 -0.12 -0.37 
Tigers       -0.11  -1.69  -0.36  -0.18  0.08 0.12 -0.36 
Turkey       0.03 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.09
Poorest          0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
of  which:  AFR                  -0.01 -0.16 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 
SouthAsia    0.03 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.12
World        0.04 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  INDUSTRIAL LIBERALISATION IN THE DOHA ROUND | 35 
 
Table A.4.8. Effects on capital return, by region (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(g) Girard 1 + SDT
(f) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07
of which:  EU25         0.04 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05
Japan        0.07 0.50 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.24
US           0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
ANZCERTA    0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.16
Canada            -0.00 -0.24 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 
EFTA         0.05 -0.08  -0.06  -0.04  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04 
HKTaSgp      0.19 0.46 0.03 -0.04  -0.11  -0.15  0.05
Korea        0.14 0.44 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.23
Developing  ctries -0.07 -0.88 -0.17 -0.09 -0.01  0.01 -0.19 
of which:  Argentina    -0.06  -0.65  -0.10  -0.03  0.00 0.01 -0.15 
Brazil       -0.19  -1.19  -0.24  -0.10  0.01 0.04 -0.31 
China              -0.25 -1.22 -0.67 -0.59 -0.49 -0.45 -0.62 
INDIA              -0.94 -2.24 -0.81 -0.53 -0.19 -0.19 -0.70 
Maghreb      2.69 1.44 1.98 2.07 2.05 2.05 2.13
Mexico            -0.02 -0.79 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.14 
Row          -0.07  -0.67  -0.13  -0.08  -0.02  -0.01  -0.18 
RSAm         -0.08  -0.92  -0.10  -0.04  0.02 0.02 -0.21 
Russia       -0.04  -0.38  0.08 0.11 0.11 0.16 -0.00 
SACU         0.57 0.54 0.48 0.39 0.21 0.20 0.28
Tigers       -0.16  -1.12  -0.07  0.03 0.15 0.22 -0.13 
Turkey       0.07 -0.02  0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04
Poorest          -0.03 -0.29 -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 
of which:  AFR          -0.01  -0.29  -0.11  -0.08  -0.05  -0.06  -0.11 
SouthAsia      -0.05 -0.29 -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 
World        0.02 -0.06  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01  
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Table A.4.9. Effects on real exchange rates, by region (% change) 
 
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(g) Girard 1 + SDT
(f) Girard 1, on applied tariffs 
Industrialised ctries
of which:  EU25         0.42 1.43 0.34 0.18 0.02 -0.02  0.43
Japan        0.54 2.67 1.05 0.75 0.43 0.54 1.03
US           0.30 0.60 -0.07  -0.17  -0.26  -0.32  -0.01 
ANZCERTA    0.54 0.86 0.32 0.22 0.12 0.05 0.26
Canada            0.27 0.41 -0.22 -0.31 -0.36 -0.47 -0.14 
EFTA         0.30 1.19 0.19 0.05 -0.09  -0.14  0.28
HKTaSgp      0.45 2.50 0.87 0.58 0.29 0.32 0.87
Korea        0.58 2.72 1.12 0.84 0.56 0.57 1.08
Developing ctries
of which:  Argentina    -0.14  -2.33  -0.40  -0.10  0.06 0.09 -0.65 
Brazil       -0.27  -1.73  -0.48  -0.23  -0.03  0.01 -0.57 
China        0.28 1.05 0.57 0.50 0.47 0.61 0.65
INDIA              -2.78 -4.78 -2.02 -1.34 -0.37 -0.32 -1.79 
Maghreb          -1.66 -3.60 -1.28 -0.88 -0.71 -0.74 -1.25 
Mexico            -0.04 -1.08 -0.47 -0.40 -0.30 -0.34 -0.44 
Row          0.01 -0.54  -0.16  -0.14  -0.11  -0.12  -0.19 
RSAm                -0.01 -1.31 -0.14 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.34 
Russia       0.06 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.04
SACU         0.63 0.88 0.34 0.19 -0.03  -0.04  0.19
Tigers       0.10 0.71 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.34 0.39
Turkey       0.32 0.46 0.04 -0.01  -0.03  -0.07  0.10
Poorest     
of which:  AFR          0.13 0.09 -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  -0.09  -0.00 
SouthAsia    0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.11  
Source: Authors’ simulations.  | 37 
Appendix 5. Decomposition of welfare changes  
Table A.5.1. Decomposition of welfare changes in developed countries (equivalent variation, %) 
 
Scenarios Sensitivity analysis
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete 
liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on 
applied tariffs 
Baseline
Sigma x 2
Mirage, after agric lib'n
K endog
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
EU25         Allocative efficiency gains 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
Terms of trade gains 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other gains 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
Welfare 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.04
Japan        Allocative efficiency gains 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.04
Terms of trade gains 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Other gains 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.51 0.01 0.01
Welfare 0.05 0.33 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.65 0.09 0.10
US           Allocative efficiency gains 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Terms of trade gains 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
Other gains 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.01
Welfare 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.01
ANZCERTA   Allocative efficiency gains 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.12
Terms of trade gains 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Other gains 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.02
Welfare 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.29 0.08 0.44 0.13 0.15
Canada       Allocative efficiency gains 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07
Terms of trade gains 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07
Other gains 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.26 -0.02 -0.02
Welfare 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.33 -0.04 -0.02
EFTA         Allocative efficiency gains 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.33 0.53 0.57
Terms of trade gains 0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
Other gains -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.30 -0.50 -0.12 -0.32 -0.40 -0.43
Welfare 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.12 0.16
HKTaSgp      Allocative efficiency gains 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.07
Terms of trade gains 0.08 0.75 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.30
Other gains 0.01 -0.16 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12 0.59 -0.03 -0.04
Welfare 0.11 0.67 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.88 0.27 0.33
Korea        Allocative efficiency gains 0.03 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.13 0.17
Terms of trade gains 0.11 0.37 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.26
Other gains 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.12 -0.02 1.63 0.10 0.12
Welfare 0.18 0.63 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.53 0.31 2.07 0.46 0.54 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
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Table A.5.2. Decomposition of welfare changes in developing countries (equivalent  
variation, %) 
 
Scenarios Sensitivity analysis
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete 
liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on 
applied tariffs 
Baseline
Sigma x 2
Mirage, after agric lib'n
K endog
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
Argentina    Allocative efficiency gains 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05
Terms of trade gains -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Other gains -0.02 -0.44 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02
Welfare -0.02 -0.51 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.01 0.03
Brazil       Allocative efficiency gains 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.11
Terms of trade gains -0.08 -0.42 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Other gains -0.03 -0.26 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.29 -0.02 -0.02
Welfare -0.05 -0.54 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.29 0.03 0.04
China        Allocative efficiency gains 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.33 0.10 0.21 0.26 0.35
Terms of trade gains -0.01 -0.19 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03
Other gains -0.13 -0.82 -0.52 -0.48 -0.42 -0.43 -0.50 -0.52 -0.71 -0.47 0.05 -0.12 -0.16
Welfare -0.13 -0.86 -0.44 -0.37 -0.27 -0.25 -0.39 -0.37 -0.38 -0.37 0.27 0.15 0.16
INDIA        Allocative efficiency gains 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.33 0.15 0.15 0.42 0.43 0.76 0.32 0.36 0.58 0.73
Terms of trade gains -0.44 -0.93 -0.32 -0.21 -0.06 -0.05 -0.29 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.25
Other gains -0.44 -0.92 -0.39 -0.27 -0.11 -0.11 -0.33 -0.37 -0.37 -0.26 -1.87 -0.32 -0.37
Welfare -0.38 -1.11 -0.27 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.14 -1.71 0.05 0.11
Maghreb      Allocative efficiency gains 2.71 3.02 1.94 1.74 1.61 1.60 2.08 2.63 3.98 1.76 2.61 2.75 3.08
Terms of trade gains -0.66 -1.44 -0.40 -0.25 -0.18 -0.18 -0.41 -0.25 -0.19 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 -0.27
Other gains 0.12 -0.56 0.37 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.34 -0.41 -0.56 0.49 -0.54 -0.79 -0.80
Welfare 2.18 1.02 1.91 1.96 1.94 1.94 2.01 1.96 3.23 1.99 1.82 1.70 2.01
Mexico       Allocative efficiency gains 0.15 0.42 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.07 -0.06 0.09 0.11
Terms of trade gains -0.09 -0.54 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
Other gains -0.03 -0.37 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -1.43 -0.04 -0.05
Welfare 0.03 -0.48 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 -1.57 -0.04 -0.03
Row          Allocative efficiency gains 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.06
Terms of trade gains -0.06 -0.40 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03
Other gains 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.01
Welfare 0.00 -0.32 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.25 -0.01 0.03
RSAm         Allocative efficiency gains 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06
Terms of trade gains -0.06 -0.47 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Other gains 0.00 -0.25 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01
Welfare -0.03 -0.62 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.05
Russia       Allocative efficiency gains 0.08 0.41 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.20
Terms of trade gains -0.03 -0.13 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Other gains -0.05 -0.30 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.20 -0.04 -0.04
Welfare 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.15 0.40 0.14 0.20
SACU         Allocative efficiency gains 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.28 0.52 0.19 0.38 0.31 0.41
Terms of trade gains 0.02 -0.17 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11
Other gains 0.02 -0.26 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 0.79 -0.22 -0.25
Welfare 0.21 -0.21 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.39 0.09 1.13 0.00 0.05
Tigers       Allocative efficiency gains 0.49 0.81 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.58 0.76 1.78 0.45 0.95 0.83 1.03
Terms of trade gains -0.17 -0.60 -0.03 0.04 0.13 0.19 -0.06 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05
Other gains -0.38 -0.98 -0.44 -0.39 -0.32 -0.31 -0.47 -0.64 -1.20 -0.34 1.52 -0.45 -0.53
Welfare -0.07 -0.78 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.36 0.05 0.17 0.69 0.13 2.48 0.44 0.55
Turkey       Allocative efficiency gains 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Terms of trade gains 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03
Other gains 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Welfare 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 
Source: Authors’ simulations.  
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Table A.5.3. Decomposition of welfare changes in poor countries (equivalent variation, %) 
 
 
Scenarios Sensitivity analysis
(a) Peaks elimination
(b) Complete 
liberalization
(c) Girard 0.65
(d) Girard 1
(e) Girard 2
(f) Girard 1 + SDT
(g) Girard 1, on 
applied tariffs 
Baseline
Sigma x 2
Mirage, after agric lib'n
K endog
Perfect comp'n
No vertical diff'n
AFR          Allocative efficiency gains 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Terms of trade gains -0.02 -0.19 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01
Other gains 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.23 -0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.00
Welfare 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.24 -0.04 -0.17 0.01 0.04
SouthAsia    Allocative efficiency gains 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
Terms of trade gains -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.10
Other gains -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.00
Welfare -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.08 0.14 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
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Appendix 6. The model’s equations 
 
Supply 
Leontieff relation between value added and intermediate consumption: 
Imperfect competition: 
NBi,r (Yi,r + cfi,r) = aVAi,r VAi,r = aCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
NBi,r PYi,r (Yi,r + cfi,r) = PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
Perfect competition: 
Yi,r = aVAi,r VAi,r = aCNTERi,r CNTERi,r 
PYi,r Yi,r = PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r + Pquotai,r Quotai,r 
 
Determination of factors demand by producers results from the following optimisation 
programmes: 
Min  PVAi,rVAi,r = PLi,rLi,r + PTEi,rTEi,r + PRNi,rRNi,r + PQi,rQi,r 
s.t.:
 
i VA i VA i VA i VA i VA
1
- 1
r i, r i, TE
1
- 1
r i, r i, RN
1
- 1
r i, r i, Q
1
- 1
r i, i L
1
- 1
r i, TE a RN   a Q   a L a VA σ σ σ σ σ + + + =
 
and 
Min  PQi,r Qi,r = PKi,r Ki,r + PHi,r Hi,r 
s.t.: 
i CAP i CAP i CAP σ
1
- 1
r i, r i, H σ
1
- 1
r i, r i, K σ
1
- 1
r i, H a K a Q + =
 
 
 
Demand  
LES-CES (first stage) 
Ci,r - cmini,r = aCi,r UTr 
C
r i,
r
PC
P
σ
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
 
Pr UTr =
( ) ∑
i
r i, r i, r i, cmin - C PC
 
BUDCr = 
∑
i
r i, r i, C PC
 
PCi,r  = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxcci,r) 
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Intermediate consumption (first stage) 
ICi,j,r = aICi,j,r CNTERj,r
IC
  PIC
PCNTER
r j, i,
r j,
σ
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
 
PCNTER j,r CNTER j,r = 
∑
i
r j, i, r j, i,   IC   PIC
 
PICi,j,r = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxicci,j,r) 
Capital good (first stage) 
epar REVr = PINVTOTr INVTOTr 
KG i,r = aKGi,r INVTOTr
KG
r i,
r
PKG
PINVTOT
σ
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
 
PINVTOTr INVTOTr =
∑
i
r i, r i, KG PKG
 
PKGi,r = PDEMTOTi,r (1+taxkgci,r) 
Total demand 
DEMTOTi,r = Ci,r +
∑
j
r j, i, IC
+ KGi,r 
Groups of regions (second stage) 
Min  PDEMTOTi,r DEMTOTi,r = PDEMUi,r DEMUi,r + PDEMVi,r DEMVi,r 
s.t.: 
i GEO i GEO i GEO
1
- 1
r i, r i, V
1
- 1
r i, r i, U
1
- 1
r i, DEMV a DEMU a DEMTOT σ σ σ + =
 
 
Armington (third stage) 
Min  PDEMUi,r DEMUi,r = PDEMi,r,r DEMi,r,r + PDEMETRi,r DEMETRi,r 
s.t.: 
i ARM i ARM i ARM
1
- 1
r i, r i, ETR
1
- 1
r r, i, r i, LOC
1
- 1
r i, DEMETR a DEM a DEMU σ σ σ + =
 
 
Regions (forth stage) 
For foreign regions of the same level of development: 
DEMi,r,s = aimPi,r,s DEMETRi,s
 
s r, i,
s i,
i IMP
PDEM
PDEMETR
 
σ
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
 
PDEMETRi,s DEMETRi,s =
∑
∈Etra(s) r
s r, i, s r, i, DEM PDEM
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For foreign regions of different levels of development: 
DEMi,r,s = aimPi,r,s DEMVi,s
i IMP
s r, i,
s i,
PDEM
PDEMV
 
σ
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
 
() ( ) ∑
∈
=
V(s) r
- 1
s r, i, s r, i, IMP
- 1
s i,
i IMP i IMP PDEM a PDEMV
σ σ
 
Varieties (fifth stage, imperfect competition) 
DEMVARi,r,s = DEMi,r,s
i VAR
1
- 1
t r, i, NB σ  
PDEMi,r,s = PDEMVARi,r,s
i VAR - 1
1
t r, i, NB σ  
 
 
Commodity market equilibrium 
Imperfect competition: 
Yi,r =
∑
s
s r, i, DEMVAR
 
TRADEi,r,s = NBi,r DEMVARi,r,s 
Perfect competition: 
Yi,r =
∑
s
s r, i, DEM
 (i ≠ TrT) 
YTrt,r  =
∑ +
s
r s r, , TRM DEMTrT
 
TRADEi,r,s = DEMi,r,s 
 
 
Transport sector 
Transport demand: 
TRi,r,s = µi,r,s TRADEi,r,s 
MONDTR = 
∑
s r, i,
s r, i, TR
 
Transport supply: 
MONDTR  = aT
∏
r
r
r TRM
θ
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Full use of endowments 
Lbarr = ∑
j
t r, j, L
 
TEbarr = ∑
j
r j, TE
 
Hbarr = ∑
j
r j, H
 
Mobility: 
PLj,r = PLbarr 
PTEj,r = PTEbarr 
PH j,r = PHbarr 
PKi,r = Pkbarr 
K and land returns, subsidies included: 
WKi,r = PKi,r + TsubKi,r 
WTEi,r = PTEi,r + TsubTEi,r 
Land supply: 
WTEbarr TEbarr = 
r i,
i
r i, TE WTE ∑
 
TEbarr = TEbarOr
TEbar σ
r WTEbar   (NB: WTEbarOr = 1) 
Land allocation: 
TEi,r = bTi,r TEbarr 
TE σ
r
r i,
WTEbar
WTE
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
 
 
 
Price definition 
CIF price: 
PCIFi,r,s =  ()    EP 1
PY
s r, i,
r i,
+
(1+taxPi,r) (1+TAXEXPi,r,s+taxAMFi,r,s) + µi,r,s PT  (imp. competition) 
PCIFi,r,s = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r) (1+TAXEXPi,r,s+taxAMFi,r,s) + µi,r,s PT  (perfect competition) 
Sale price: 
PDEMVARi,r,s = PCIFi,r,s (1+DDi,r,s)  (imperfect competition) 
PDEMi,r,s = PCIFi,r,s (1+DDi,r,s)  (perfect competition) 
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Revenue 
Profits (imperfectly competitive sectors): 
0 = PYi,r () ∑ + s s r, i,
s r, i,
EP 1
TRADE
- (PVAi,r VAi,r + PCNTERi,r CNTERi,r) 
Tax revenues: 
RECPRODi,r = taxPi,r PYi,r  () ∑ + s s r, i,
s r, i,
EP 1
TRADE
  (imperfect competition) 
RECPRODi,r = taxPi,r PYi,r Yi,r  (perfect competition) 
RECEXPi,r = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r) () ∑ +
+
s s r, i,
s r, i,
s r, i, s r, i, EP 1
TRADE
) taxAMF (TAXEXP
  (imp. 
competition) 
RECEXPi,r = PYi,r (1+taxPi,r)
∑ +
s
s r, i, s r, i, s r, i, TRADE ) taxAMF (TAXEXP
  (perf. 
competition) 
RECDDi,s =
∑
r
s r, i, s r, i, s r, i, TRADE PCIF DD
 
RECCONSi,r, = PDEMTOTi,r (taxcci,r Ci,r + taxkgci,r KGi,r +
r j, i,
j
r j, i, IC taxicc ∑
) 
RECTAXr = 
r i, r i, r i,
i
r i, RECCONS RECDD RECEXP RECPROD + + + ∑
 
Regional equilibrium: 
REVr + SOLDr = ∑ + +
i
r i, r i, r i, r i, r i, r i, K PK TE PTE RN PRN
 
+ PLbarr Lbarr + PHbarr Hbarr + RECTAXr +
r s,
s
s r, rente rente − ∑
 
Savings: BUDCr = (1-epar) REVr 
 
 
Imperfect competition 
Definition of market shares: 
∑
∈
=
Etra(s) rr
s rr, i, s rr, i,
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s r, i, DEM PDEM
DEM PDEM
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Mark-up in domestic markets: 
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Mark-up in foreign markets in countries with the same level of development: 
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Mark-up in foreign markets in countries with different levels of development: 
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